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It's a (Two-)Culture Thing: The Lateral
Shift to Liberation
Barry Kew

F

rom an acute and, some will argue, a harsh,
a harsh, fantastic or even tactically naive
naive perspective, this article examines
examines animal liberation, vegetarianism
vegetarianism and veganism in relation to a
bloodless culture ideal. It suggests that the
movement's repeated anomalies, denial of heritage,
privileging of vegetarianism, and other concessions
to bloody culture, restrict rather than liberate the
full subversionary and revelatory potential of
liberationist discourse, and with representation and
strategy implications.
‘Only the profoundest cultural needs … initially caused adult man [sic] to
continue to drink cow milk through life’. 1
In The Social Construction of Nature, Klaus Eder develops a useful concept
of two cultures - the bloody and the bloodless. He understands the
ambivalence of modernity and the relationship to nature as resulting
from the perpetuation of a precarious equilibrium between the
‘bloodless’ tradition from within Judaism and the ‘bloody’ tradition of
ancient Greece.
In Genesis, killing entered the world after the fall from grace and
initiated a complex and hierarchically-patterned system of food taboos
regulating distance between nature and culture. But, for Eder, it is in
Israel that the reverse process also begins, in the taboo on killing. This
‘civilizing’ process replaces the prevalent ancient world practice of

Calvin. W. Schwabe, ‘Animals in the Ancient World’ in Aubrey Manning and James
Serpell, (eds), Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives (Routledge, London,
1994), p.54.
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human sacrifice by animal sacrifice, this by sacrifices of the field, and
these by money paid to the sacrificial priests. 2
Modern society retains only a very broken connection to the Jewish
tradition of the bloodless sacrifice. It continues instead a different
traditional evolutionary line which emerges from the Greek polis. This
ritual ‘civilized’ the earlier blood sacrifices in a different way to the
Jewish tradition. It did not abolish them but retained them instead as a
sacrificial feast in Delphi against the resistance of Pythagorean and other
groups who attempted to call this central symbol of the polis into
question. 3 The dominant modern cultural code continues this older
tradition, the bloody culture of Hellenistic antiquity, and symbolizes the
fundamental distance from the state of nature. 4 It is the co-existence of
these, developing into carnivorous and vegetarian cultures, that opens
two fundamentally different evolutionary options to modern society. 5
We shall borrow the two culture concept and use it as a structuring
device for our own purposes and, although we shall not be clinging to
Eder's thesis, we shall draw upon it. 6 Here we shall be assuming that
animal liberation both constitutes and aims at the transformation of
bloody into bloodless culture, at least in the most propitious conditions
of the Western world initially. As representative of animal liberation we
shall take first the most often quoted works of three of the movement's
foremost philosophers - Peter Singer, Stephen Clark and Tom Regan but we shall not offer critiques of their use of the philosophical traditions
out of which they come, or indeed of the traditions themselves. 7 Instead,
and in a rather severe textual reading, we shall question animal
liberation in relation to the two cultures. To start, we shall measure the
canonical works against the slavery analogy, drawn by animal
2 Klaus Eder, The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological Enlightenment
(Sage, London, 1996), p.125.
3 Ibid., p.126.
4 Ibid., pp.129-130.
5 Ibid., p.132.
6 Indeed, we cannot continue with Eder's bloody-carnivorous and bloodless-vegetarian
cultures throughout, for Eder depicts ecological reason as vegetarian culture when the
ecology movement is not necessarily vegetarian at all (in practice) whilst animal
liberation has become so (in theory and in practice). Eder also tends to run animals and
nature together, and views animal liberation almost wholly in utilitarianist terms.
Further, although Eder pictures carnivorous culture as a development of bloody
culture, and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless, we shall use carnivorous and
bloody interchangeably and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless.
7 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals , 1975
(Avon, New York, 1977); Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals , 1977
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983
(Routledge, London, 1988).
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advocates for centuries, which will allow us to explore statements of
animal liberation intent and therefore gain clues as to its ‘culture’ status,
which will then be examined against a different model. We shall finally
be able to suggest certain implications of the findings.

The Slavery Analogy
In an attempt to make animal liberation more credible and to awaken
public consciousness to the scale, nature and values of animal use, the
animal liberation movement uses several parallels, and abolitionism
seems to be the most pertinent. Black peoples and other Others under
slavery, like nonhumans now and in the past, were used as renewable
(and expendable rather than exterminable) natural resources in a
respectable economic system. The systematic atrocities of human
slavery bear striking resemblance to the concept and practices of
institutionalized animal use and continuities are identifiable. 8 Moreover,
both animal use and human slavery have been considered at various
times synonymous with the process of civilizing and the progress of
civilization.
Let us assume the case then, acknowledging that there will always be
exceptional, extraordinary and non-representative situations to which
no philosophy can hope to extend with consistency (and this is not to
assume, as the philosophies themselves do not assume, an absolute
inviolability of all animal life). Let us assume that an animal liberation
case could be made out, declaring that, à la the abolitionist case, humans
should not deliberately use nonhumans for any non-symbolic purpose
(except perhaps in non-invasive ethological studies in the wild) or in
any material way in order to utilize their symbolic power. The aim of
the abolitionists was abolition, not kinder treatment, better conditions,
longer chains, fewer slaves, gentle usage or a different kind of slavery.
Slavery was wrong, according to the campaigners, and the world (or
most of it) came to agree or to see the wrong and put an end to it. How
do the philosophers’ prescriptions stand in relation to this abolitionism?
Not full square.
Clark's promotion of anti-vivisection, for instance, is qualified by talk of
abolishing ‘most’ biomedical research on animals, 9 without saying what
Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989) pp.1-2; Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and
Animal Slavery (Heretic Books, London, 1988).
9 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.xiii.
8
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should be left to continue and on what basis, and although Regan
appears to be quite straightforward in his demands - for vegetarianism,
anti-vivisection and an end to hunting and trapping - his idea that it is
‘commercial’ animal agriculture which should be abolished leaves one
considering what ‘non-commercial’ animal agriculture is envisaged as
acceptable within his rights theory. 10 As he implies, no animal-product
system is viable in the long term without routine mutilation and
slaughter, a similar point made in relation to suffering by Singer who
calls for an end to the use of animals in trivial experiments whilst the
suffering in non-trivial research can continue until alternative methods
are found. 11
None of the three cases actually makes out a clear, unambiguous case
for an end to all animal-using practices and, of an activity such as horse
riding for instance, a classic master/slave relationship, there is no
mention. Understandably, Singer, Clark and Regan concentrated on the
areas in which vast numbers of animals are used and/or where
institutionalized cruelties are more readily detectable, and did not set
out to establish in detail the ‘proper’, or ‘better’ constructed behaviour
in regard to all human/nonhuman practices and relations. Instead they
establish principles from which we may be able to assume it in most if
not all areas. But although we may extrapolate in order to get a grip on
how we should look upon, say, animal circuses - obviously
unacceptable to Singer, Clark and Regan albeit on different grounds what guidance is there for something as innocuous to the orthodox as
horse riding? 12
It is in this relationship that we can recognize: a human pastime
presented and widely perceived as respectable; the combination of
animals and war-victory - the hunting field as a preparation for battle
and the use of animals for human warring purposes; animals considered
as resources; the exercise of power and the domination of ‘nature’; the
animal use=civilization equation; and the hidden stories of slavery
which in different ways lie behind the use of animals - horses ‘broken’,
family groups separated, animals not up to it or beyond it cast off.
Moreover, once broken and separated it is still looked upon as a
kindness to find them ‘work’, to keep them active, a practical example of

Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, (Routledge, London, 1988), pp.349-351.
Singer, Animal Liberation, p.32.
12 This is not to enter into the crass area of objection-query - eg what about locusts,
mosquitoes and rabid dogs, and should amoebae get the vote? - in which animal
liberation is commonly bogged down.
10
11
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culture passing itself off as benign nature (welfarism notably obscuring
their confinement in barren fields deprived of cover and denied shelter).
Now horse riding is possibly too complex for preference utilitarianism
to condemn easily and it is not at all clear from Clark's work how it
stands in relation to the ancient virtues of his neo-Platonist earth
household. From Regan’s Case we can get the idea that horse riding may
be anathema to at least rights theory, which can accommodate the
objection, although it is only an informed guess: Regan's ‘not all harms
hurt’ and his dissident reality of ‘animals are not our resources’ are
shown to us in the contexts of more obvious harmful or hurtful use. 13
As we have seen them so far then, these philosophies do not actually
spell out what some of them may imply and what they imply could be
spelled out, and especially in a case such as horse riding. Indeed,
precisely because of its ‘innocuity’, a condemnation of horse riding - or
‘riding’ as its practitioners prefer it to be known: again the invisible
animal - may be a classic statement of animal liberation from which a
position on virtually every topic within the project could be then
confidently assumed. Perhaps this could help liberate animal liberation
from the confusion or seemingly endless and generally welfarist- (and
therefore bloody culture-) framed, cruelty-abuse-suffering-grounded
debate to which the liberation issue is popularly and politically
relocated and by the terms of which even vivisection and factory
farming can be and are easily defended. 14
Taking the foremost philosophers’ seminal works, we find discrepancies
between the human and animal slavery abolitionisms. We have to look
elsewhere for the kind of consistency 15 we may require and get closer to
a best existing model of and for animal liberation as an abolitionist,
bloodless culture.

Bryant condemns horse riding but from an anti-cruelty perspective, albeit within an
animal ‘rights’ framework. John Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms: An Examination of a
Changing Ethic (J. M. Bryant, Chard, 1982).
14 The liberationist fear may be of abolitionism being too easily equated with
absolutism, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘extremism’ (as it is by Jasper and Nelkin) or even
‘purism’, a fate from which other abolitionisms and emancipations are saved by the
ability of new rights-holders to negotiate their own ‘working’ roles in society. On that
score, animal liberation is a threat to the work ethic. J. M. Jasper, and D. Nelkin, The
Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (The Free Press, New York, 1992),
p.96, p.178.
15 This is not to question the internal consistency or coherence of the adopted or
adapted philosophies.
13
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Veganism: A Neglected Model
Shortly after the Vegan Society was formed in 1944, and the word
‘vegan’ coined by co-founder and first Secretary Donald Watson, it
issued a Manifesto which included the following aims:
To advocate that man's food should be derived
from fruit, nuts, vegetables, grains and other
wholesome non-animal products and that it should
exclude flesh, fish, fowl, eggs, honey, and animals'
milk, butter and cheese.
The Vegan Society is eager that it should be realised
how closely the meat and dairy produce industries
are related. The atrocities of dairy farming are, in
some ways, greater than those of the meat industry
but they are more obscured by ignorance. 16
Further, it was proclaimed in 1951, that:
The object of the Vegan Movement (“to end the
exploitation of animals by man”) is clarified as to
the meaning of exploitation by Rule 4(a), which
pledges the Society to “seek to end the use of
animals by man for food, commodities, work,
hunting, vivisection, and by all other uses involving
exploitation of animal life by man”. By the adoption
of this rule, the Society has clearly come out on the
side of the liberators; it is not so much welfare that
we seek, as freedom. Our aim is not to make the
present relationship between man and animal
(which if honestly viewed is mostly one of master
and slave) more tolerable, but to abolish it and
replace it by something more worthy of man’s high
estate. In short, our aim is to set the creatures free to return them to the balance and sanity of nature,
which is their rightful place, and so end the historic
wrong perpetrated when man first decided he had
the right to exploit and enslave them. 17
Now this throws up much we could discuss and which many would
criticize - the perhaps primary concern about who ‘Man’ is; the take on a
pure ‘nature’; the appeal to design; and so on (these being characteristic
of the early Vegan Society stance) - but our point is that Leslie Cross
16
17
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Leslie J. Cross, ‘The New Constitution’, The Vegan, (Spring 1951).
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went on to claim that this new constitution marked the ‘true birth’ of the
Vegan Society and, if we are to measure animal liberation against the
slavery analogy, this surely is the best available (albeit unparticularized)
statement of intent. Can the master/slave relationship of horse riding be
accommodated here (even if it was beyond the range of contemporary
concern)? Only by preternormal sophistry.
The Society, and vegans in general, had already established and were to
consolidate a practical underpinning to animal liberation, living with
moral consistency and proving the ethic's firm grounding. So, to what
extent do Singer, Clark and Regan build on such codification? The great
anomaly is, as we know, that Singer's Animal Liberation actually
promotes the use of animals. That Singer should, some thirty years after
the Society’s founding, approach the subject of animal liberation in the
following way, is perhaps rather curious, notwithstanding the
reasonable pragmatics - a chapter entitled ‘Becoming a Vegetarian’ 18
rather than ‘Becoming a Vegan’; a toleration of mollusc-eating; 19
promotion of egg-eating, where a welfarist-bloody culture stance is
openly adopted; 20 the use of inverted commas for vegan; the phrase ‘…
some have begun to call themselves vegans’; 21 the adoption, like Salt, of a
‘worst abuses first’ stance; 22 the deliberation over where to draw the line
between killing shrimps and oysters whilst considering the sufferings
(and suffering is Singer's main concern) of the dairy cow and calf as a
lesser issue; 23 and, in a concession to popular rhetoric, the general
depiction of veganism as ‘strict’ and somewhat esoteric. Do Clark and
Regan also keep veganism at arm's length? Clark makes this claim:
What follows for our obligations? Simply, that if we
are to mean what we say in outlawing the
unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become,
at the least, vegetarians. 24
With veganism well established - and with the routine chickicide of dayold males, the suffering of the dairy cow and the immediate or delayed
slaughter or crated future of her calf exposed (again) by the Vegan
Society - Clark did not feel the need to write instead, ‘we must become,
Singer, Animal Liberation, p.163.
Ibid., p.179.
20 Ibid., p.181; Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 1990, Second edition (Pimilco, London,
1995), pp.175-176.
21 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.179.
22 Ibid., pp.181-182.
23 Ibid.
24 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.45.
18
19
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at the least, vegans’. Although he refers to veganism several times, as a
stage of progression, thus implying as is usual, that veganism is a
material development rather than a cognitive transformation (‘… those
vegetarians who have not (yet) progressed to veganism’ he says, for
instance, in his ‘Notes for Proselytes’ after the main body of the work), 25
it is vegetarianism for which he makes the case. However, he does grant
veganism greater credibility and probability: ‘There will be less
suffering in a vegan world, even in a near-vegan world’. 26 But, although
declaring in a footnote that ‘veganism is a better project than lactovegetarianism’, he goes on to say: ‘we may in the end be able to take
some milk from our kin without injustice’. 27 But why this concession to
the purely cultural (whilst the essentialism of ‘meat’-eating is
outlawed)? And is this, along with other backyard images, what Regan
had in mind when he condemned only ‘commercial’ animal agriculture?
There is also Regan's preference for the word ‘vegetarian’ which is used
throughout The Case for Animal Rights. Now it had for long been the
American practice, somewhat in contrast to English usage since the
1940s-50s, to use the word ‘vegetarian’ as all-embracing (and technically
correct it is or, more accurately, was), despite the existence of an
American Vegan Society since 1960. So it is reasonable to assume that
Regan, in talking of the total dissolution of commercial animal farming,
was perhaps thinking veganically, reservations about ‘commercial’
notwithstanding. This is supported, for instance, by Regan's later article
with Gary Francione which claims that rights (now seen in vegan terms)
and welfare ideologies are morally incompatible, a tacit understanding
of bloody and bloodless cultures. 28 Nevertheless, ‘vegan’ was not used
ten years earlier in the major work which came partly as a response to
Singer, who differentiated between vegetarians and vegans.
Is Regan's whole effect warped by not using the word ‘vegan’? Not
using it can lead not least to problems of both spatial and intellectual
comprehension as any vegan, considered to be ‘a vegetarian’, has found
in hotels, restaurants, on airlines or even as a guest in a private home.
The implications are far-reaching, for by it, both here and in Singer and
Clark, vegetarianism is typically equated with rights theory and indeed
with animal rights and animal liberation. When we can regularly read
about celebrities and others being described as ‘vegetarians’ only to find
Ibid., p.213.
Ibid., p.80.
27 Ibid., p.185.
28 Tom Regan and Gary Francione, ‘A Movement's Means Create its Ends’, The Vegan,
(Winter, 1993). First published in The Animals' Agenda, (January-February, 1992).
25
26
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that they eat fish, the word and concept of veganism, by contrast,
constitute a clear and unequivocal statement (or do so when not
clouded by vegetarianism).
Vegetarianism's milky dilutions would appear not only to weaken the
vegan, animal-free, comprehensive principle but also fail to loosen
sufficiently
orthodoxy’s
long
established
meanings
of
human/nonhuman relations and definitions of animal liberation. There
can still be detected an accommodating vagueness (and tactical
tortuousness) which only disappears with veganism’s clearing away of
shams, fictions and concealments, its lack of concession to orthodox
ontology and, see Adams 1994, its determining epistemology. 29 There is
a world (or world-view) of difference between vegetarianism and
veganism. It's a culture thing, as we shall see.

A Repeated Anomaly
The chronology is awry then; momentum appears to have been lost. For
whatever reasons or motives (and there is an obvious tension between
ethics and tactics), veganism was not or appeared not to be the
philosophers’ alpha (leaving aside pre-verbal mappings) and omega in
the 1970s and '80s. This had happened before: it is a repeated anomaly.
In 1892, Henry Salt had claimed in Animals' Rights that assertions of one
form of animal exploitation being more or less cruel than any other,
were ‘irrelevant’ 30 whilst at the same time advocating egg-eating, milkdrinking and wool-wearing. 31 What places Salt, like Singer, Clark and
Regan it would seem, within the increasingly identifiable area of bloody
and bloodless culture tension are comments which can be juxtaposed
thus:
It is little use to claim ‘rights’ for animals in a vague
general way, if with the same breath we explicitly
show our determination to subordinate those rights
to anything and everything that can be construed
into a human ‘want’. 32

Carol J. Adams, ‘Beastly Theology: When Epistemology Creates Ontology’ in her
Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (Continuum, New York,
1994).
30 Henry S. Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress, 1892 (Centaur
Press, Fontwell, 1980), p.106.
31 e.g. Ibid., p.43; Henry S. Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism: Essays and Dialogues (London
Vegetarian Society, London, nd (1899)), pp.35-38.
32 Salt, Animal Rights Considered, p.9.
29
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And, perhaps out of a narrow focus on normative cruelty:
What I say will of course have no reference to wool,
or any other substance which is obtainable without
injury to the animal from which it is taken. 33
For Salt, who considered the question of whether man is morally
justified in utilizing animal labour at all as ‘abstruse’, 34 animals were still
resources. Further:
I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary
contention that man is not morally justified in
imposing any sort of subjection on the lower
animals. 35
He was referring to the contention of Lewis Gompertz who, some
seventy years earlier, had written:
at least in the present state of society it is unjust,
and considering the unnecessary abuse they suffer
from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use
them, and to encourage their being placed in his
power. 36
Lewis Gompertz, second Secretary of the SPCA, champion of the ‘rights’
of women, blacks, the poor and nonhumans, published his Moral
Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes in 1824, a work whose
strategic and tactical approaches are reversed by Singer:
in our present speciesist world, it is not easy to keep
so strictly to what is morally right [i.e. not using
dairy products]. 37
We see from Gompertz that it was not the case, as some have claimed,
that Salt left little for his heirs to add, but that he and they left out a lot
of Gompertz who, although his work is not fully formulated, being
more of an uncertain inclination, outlined most of what was to follow,
and more. Recognizing human-nonhuman similitude, animals' personal
identity, and promoting equal pleasure and happiness in the cause of
Ibid., p.79
Ibid., p.43.
35 Ibid., p.33.
36 Cited in Ibid.
37 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.181.
33
34
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what was moral and just, Gompertz was, like some others6, 38 a vegan
long before the word was coined, dispensing with wool, leather, silk
and eggs and refusing to ride in a horse-drawn carriage. Much of Moral
Inquiries is taken up in the form of subversionary ‘arguments’ (with
Gompertz as Z):
Y: I understand that you object to the use of milk;
what harm can there be in that?
Z: It was evidently provided for the calf, and not for
man.
Y: When the calf is taken away from its mother, it is
then a kindness to relieve her of her milk.
Z: But the calf should not be taken away. 39
For both Salt and the philosophers to fall short of overt endorsement of
Gompertz and veganism also means not capitalizing on the substantive
shift of his revelatory light which, aptly, he shines on horses. His
concern with the way they were treated appears foremost in his work
but extends beyond questions of cruelty. Asked, ‘How can man do
without the aid of horses?’, Gompertz's reply is, ‘That is his business to
find out’, 40 perhaps a typical response from one famed also for a
catalogue of technological inventions. He goes on:
It is true that we have adopted the method of
employing horses to perform our labour, by which
we have most probably only chosen one method
out of a great many, and we have remained
contented with it … What causes you to think the
services of horses so important to man is, that you
take things as they are; horses being used…. 41
What is important here is that very ability to see, not only the suffering
of horses when most others could not see it (which was Salt's concern),
but that animals, horses, were being used in the first place (which wasn't
Salt's concern, until later). 42 Gompertz exposes the mythology of animal

One of the earliest recorded vegans in Britain was Roger Crab who died at Bethnal
Green in 1680 (see The Vegan, Summer, 1997, p.25) but, as early as 3BC, Porphyry and
Claudius Neapolitan wrangled over dispensing with all animal products.
39 Lewis Gompertz, Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and Brutes, 1824 (Centaur
Press, Fontwell, 1992), p.97.
40 Ibid., p.122.
41 Ibid., pp.123-125.
42 Salt came to see it more from Gompertz's angle: ‘a civilized posterity will shudder at
the sight of what we still regard as a legitimate agent of locomotion’. Henry S. Salt,
Seventy Years Among Savages (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1921), p.217.
38
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use naturalism and inevitability and, in the milk argument above, of
bloody culture's tender mercies.
Regardless of the philosophical position or other grounding, and of
interim tactical considerations, espousing animal liberation without
affirming and valorizing veganism - as both theoretical starting point
and practical aim - when the model(s) already exist, takes animal
liberation’s eyes off the prize. Whether Regan and Clark are promoting
veganism or not, it is lacto-ovo-vegetarianism which, one hundred and
seventy years after Gompertz, is popularly taken as the obligatory
stance of animal liberationists. Indeed, the recoil, if that's what it is,
seems endemic. As Leah Leneman has shown us, the vigorous
correspondence during 1909-1912 in the Vegetarian Society's journal The
Vegetarian Messenger and Health Review had led to the conclusion that the
defence of the use of eggs and milk by vegetarians was unsatisfactory
and that the only ‘true way’ was to ‘live on cereals, pulse, fruit, nuts and
vegetables’. 43 Nevertheless, in what was becoming a familiar pattern,
this was reversed in the decades that followed.
The immediate or ultimate disdain, marginalization or even total
exclusion have also been contagious, and across the spectrum. Robert
Garner's strategy-minded work, for instance, talks of the vegetarian and
vegan societies in Britain and elsewhere all campaigning to end animal
cruelty ‘which for them involves the end of the meat industry’ (no
mention of dairy or eggs) and even manages to omit the Vegan Society
from its listing of the other three organizations which formed the Great
British MeatOut coalition in the late 1980s. 44 The ‘manifesto’ edited by
Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris had few references to veganism 45
which is at best a subtext in the review-and-recommend essays of the
Garner-edited Animal Rights: The Changing Debate. 46 Richard D Ryder's
chronicle 47 and (notably from ‘outside’ of animal liberation) Keith
Tester's new historicist exaggerations 48 merely acknowledge veganism,
Leah Leneman, ‘Britain's First Vegans?’, The Vegan, (Winter, 1997); Leah Leneman,
‘No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909-1944’, Society and Animals,
7/3, (1999), pp.219-228.
44 Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality (Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1993), p.39, p.186.
45 Ruth Harrison, ‘On Factory Farming’ in R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, and J. Harris
(eds), Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans
(Gollancz, London, 1971), p.23.
46 Robert Garner (ed), Animal Rights: The Changing Debate (Routledge, London, 1996).
47 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989).
48 Keith Tester, Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (Routledge, London,
1991).
43
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give the briefest of descriptions and fail to record the foundation or
existence of a Vegan Society, despite the latter offering a critique of
Bryant for whom, almost uniquely, veganism is de rigueur within
‘animal rights’. 49 Ted Benton's eco-socialism, which identifies rights
theory with an opposition to 'animal agriculture', nevertheless equates it
with vegetarianism (thus following the Regan confusion) and not
veganism which, again, is Cinderella'd in favour of a ‘high welfare’
model. 50 And philosopher-activists Finsen & Finsen 51 still refer to
Gompertz as a vegetarian (Singer refers to him as a ‘strict’ vegetarian 52)
and, like Singer, use inverted commas for their reference to vegans. Eder
too, in referring to animal liberation never mentions veganism and,
although his ‘vegetarian culture’ is seen in terms of negating social
order, lacto-ovo-vegetarianism maintains hierarchies in terms of the
primacy of animal protein and sustains the negative magic of complex
food taboos which normalize animal-dependent diets. 53 Indeed, for
virtually all the popular and academic literature on or referring to
animal liberation, vegetarianism rather than veganism is the common
coin.
Moreover, that Donald Watson and Leslie Cross are ignored by Magel 54
and Wynne-Tyson, 55 the two works which represent the movement's
most comprehensive and specific archaeologies of pro-animal thought,
would seem to weaken these attempts to help legitimate the tradition
and authority of animal liberation heritage through its hallowed valueleaders. 56

Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms
Ted Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (Verso,
London, 1993).
51 L. Finsen and S. Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to
Respect (Twayne, New York, 1994), p.284, p.155.
52 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.244; Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11.
53 Eder, The Social Construction of Nature.
54 Charles R. Magel, Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights (Mansell, London,
1989).
55 Jon Wynne-Tyson (ed), The Extended Circle: An Anthology of Humane Thought, 1985
(Cardinal, London, 1990).
56 Nonetheless, the value of Wynne-Tyson's work here resides not least in illustrating
how animal concern has been edited out by mainstream collections, eg the Oxford
Dictionary of Quotations. In further defence of Wynne-Tyson we should acknowledge
his largely overlooked comment on veganism in Food for a Future: ‘The logic of the
vegan case is absolute. No one - whether nutritionist, physician, sociologist or layman can rebut the veganic argument in any important respect. Veganism is part of the most
truly civilised concept of life of which the human mind has been capable’. Jon WynneTyson, Food for a Future: The Complete Case for Vegetarianism, 1975 (Centaur Press,
Fontwell, 1979), p.107
49
50
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However, there appears to have been a latterday shift towards the
vegan nexus by some. In several of the campaigning magazines one
notices at the turn of the millennium - as with Regan and Francione - a
growing emphasis on veganism in, for instance, the promotion of vegan
food items and the publication of vegan rather than vegetarian recipes.
And some hitherto hidden agendas have now been willingly revealed.
Yet it has all taken a very long time to catch the shirt tails of Watson and
Cross, indeed with those of Gompertz.
The delay has served to render animal liberation somewhat confusing
and confused as to its aims (important for those outside the movement)
and therefore its means (important to the cognoscente). Even now, the
Vegetarian Society actively promotes animal products. And, possibly for
tactical reasons, many of the (now mainly vegan-staffed) organizations
do still tend to promote by name the more ‘user-friendly’ option of
vegetarianism, and anti-vivisection organizations have promoted
‘cruelty-free’ products containing animal ingredients (thus failing to
redefine cruelty). Moreover, throughout the 1990s, there seems to have
been an increasing association of vegetarianism with ‘animal rights’
through female vegetarian-welfarist celebrities, which may sustain the
old derogatory representation of sentimental animal concern.
Although there are other factors involved, such as which foods are
‘male’ and which ‘female’ and which are essentialisms and which
culturalisms, and all the tactical decisions which will flow from such
considerations, this has much to do with the ‘worst abuses first’ stance. 57
What is 'worst' is not only arbitrarily decided but appears to depend on
the extent of one's empirical knowledge of animal use (witness Singer's
laudable volte-face on wool after reading Townend). 58 The movement
seems to have set in stone the construction that ‘meat’-eating is worse
than other forms of animal consumption, establishing a hierarchical
scale to be negotiated as one finds out more, even though knowledge of
the stories behind all animal products is more readily available now
than it was in 1892, or even in 1975 (despite the Vegan Society making
available such information for years prior to then and Singer, like Salt,
had read Gompertz before laying out his ethics). 59 Indeed, submitting to
Salt's own ‘worst abuses first’ approach to ‘extreme vegetarianism’ displays a greater
anticipation of veganism in his later The Logic of Vegetarianism. See George Hendrick
and Willene Hendrick, The Savour of Salt: A Henry Salt Anthology (Centaur Press,
Fontwell, 1989), p.27. The particular passage was omitted from the London Vegetarian
Society's revised and abridged edition (Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism)
58 Singer, Animal Liberation cf Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed.; Christine Townsend,
Pulling the Wool (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1985).
59 Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11.
57
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this, the Vegan Society is today reduced to specifically targeting
vegetarians rather than the general public(s), and the UK has still not
seen concerted anti-animal milk, anti-egg or anti-wool campaigns.
(Perhaps there is a linguistic problem: does the inability to name the
non-milk-egg-wool-using meat-eater preclude the stance and therefore
bar that road? But, conversely, if to be named is to be controlled, maybe
here is a seditious advantage to be seized).

Rebuking Vegetarianism
Crucially perhaps, the abiding common association of vegetarianism with
'animal rights' associates animal liberation with animal use, and animal
use is welfarist, bloody culture, territory. We can pursue this. Carol J
Adams offers us the notion of ‘the vegetarian quest’, the first step of
which is
experiencing the revelation of the nothingness of meat
as an item of food…which arises because one sees
that it comes from … someone, and it has been
made into … no-body. The revelation involves
recognizing the structure of the absent referent. 60
The second step is naming the relationships, eg the connection between
meat on the table and a living animal; between a sense that animals
have rights and that killing them for meat violates those rights; the
recognition of the violence of meat eating; and possibly of the continuity
between meat eating and war. This stage also enables the reclaiming of
appropriate words for meat, from euphemisms, distortions and misnaming. The third step is rebuking the meat-eating world by proving that
an alternative to meat-eating exists and that it works; ‘vegetarians…
seek to change the meat eating world’. 61
It is the second and third steps in which we are interested here.
Regarding the possibility of the second - remembering why the Society
had been formed in 1944 while war was still raging, Donald Watson
wrote the following (as Leneman 62 1999 has reminded us):
Why did we do it then of all times? Perhaps it
seemed to us a fitting antidote to the sickening
Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory
(Polity Press, London, 1990), pp.175-179.
61 Ibid.
62 Leneman, ‘No Animal Food’.
60
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experience of the War, and a reminder that we
should be doing more about the other holocaust
that goes on all the time. 63
But Watson took further Adams' third step, of rebuking the meat-eating
world. Although appreciating the efforts of vegetarians, he also rebuked
the non-vegan vegetarian world: it was to be demonstrated that veganism
works. If the Great War gave rise to a revelation of continuities between
warring and animal-eating (as it had for Salt, 64), it was the effect of the
second war which, for some, took the process across to re-connect with
Gompertz's vision.
Watson's own connection of animals, veganism and peace not only
identifies bloody culture rationalism’s nadir but also expands the war
‘front’ (another of Adams’ notions 65) to recognize not just all animals but
all animal products and, for Leslie Cross and the Society as we saw
earlier, all animal use. But Watson goes on, and in the process both
disrupts the foster mother symbolism of old world creation myth - the
Egyptian Pyramid Texts’ cultural-need depiction of the pharaoh
suckling from the cow mother of humankind - and reverses the values
of sacred and profane:
though nature provides us with lots of examples of
carnivores and vegetarians it provides us with no
examples of lacto-carnivores or lacto-vegetarians.
Such groups are freaks and only made possible by
man's capacity to exploit the reproductive functions
of other species. This, we thought, could not be
right either dietetically or ethically. It was certainly
wrong aesthetically, and we could conceive of no

63 Donald Watson, ‘Out of the Past’, The Vegan, (Summer, 1988). Watson had also
grasped what Salt seems to have suspected already at the turn of the century: that the
virtually automatic progress inherent in nineteenth century evolutionary concepts
shifted into an unspecific ‘social change’ in the twentieth; that the idea of united,
comprehensive progress was replaced by an understanding of uneven and partial
change, different aspects of society falling out of step with each other (notably the
animals issue being left aside); and that change then had to be forced – one couldn't
wait for inevitability or for the ripe time. See Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), p.184. In the light of this - and Watson had dealt with the
‘delaying tactic’: ‘There is an obvious danger in leaving the fulfilment of our ideals to
posterity, for posterity may not have our ideals’ - we could ask what ‘the plan’ is. To
wait until an as yet unspecified percentage of the population is vegetarian before
veganism dare become the name of the game? Donald Watson The Vegan News, 1,
(November, 1994).
64 Salt, Seventy Years Among Savages, pp.219-230.
65 Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat, pp.120-141.
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spectacle more bizarre than that of a grown man
attached at his meal-time to the udder of a cow. 66
Now, if humans have gone from being pre-hunt, pre-ethical vegan to
being animal eaters and then, only with the neolithic revolution, to fullblown lacto-ovo-carnivorism then, in this sense, lacto-ovovegetarianism is firmly rooted in animal-based agriculture: it is animalusing culture’s freakish form of veganism just as the animals used have
been turned into freakish Forms.
We need to re-assess the two culture concept, as it appears that we now
have two different versions. One, extending Eder’s thesis, would
perhaps place veganism as the fuller development of bloodless culture.
However, if we take our lead from the vegan exemplars, we can suggest
that veganism is no such thing but, rather, that it is veganism which is
bloodless culture, 67 wherever it originates: most plausibly perhaps in an
innate alternative potential of both individual and society. We cannot
suggest that Watson and Cross are claiming any of this, but we can
suggest that they are, in their turn, discovering and connecting with
bloodless culture as that very option, one which has been consistently
rejected and obscured since the time of cultivation and domestication,
efforts being made ever since to reconnect with the primal sympathy.
Eder’s bloodless culture starting point in Judaism can be seen as just one
effort, and the vegan Eden of the troubled writers of Genesis, torn again
between two cultures, may have been another.
Our entire history can be seen in this light. 68 Most of history's ‘bloodless
culture’ representatives - including the famous anti-cruelty foxhunters
and animal-eating anti-vivisectionists - have been in some half-way
house, trying to reach out to a bloodless culture ideal but pulled back by
the internalized values of bloody culture, the numbing and blinding
Watson, ‘Out of the Past’.
Of course, for humans at least, there is probably no such thing as truly bloodless
culture: it remains an ideal, probably an unattainable one. But, rather than using
unavoidable bloodletting - eg in the tilling of soil or in defence - as the premiss from
which to exploit, veganism is surely bloodless culture in its original and continuing
intent, in its deliberate non-use. It is the bloodless culture of which we know humans to
be capable. (Gompertz's own suggestion that we might eat animals which died of
natural causes seems to have been inspired by the belief he was encouraged to hold:
that his health would suffer without animal products, a familiar story in 1944 and even
at the turn of the millennium: bloodless culture spells anaemia for the orthodox).
68 And no less than in the equally valid light of ‘The history of all hitherto existing
society is the history of the struggle between humans and non-humans’. John Simons,
‘The Longest Revolution: Cultural Studies after Speciesism’, Environmental Values, 6,
(1997), p.484.
66
67
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comforts of its cosmology(ies), and the entirely practical impossibilities
which no longer obtain in the Western world.
Vegetarianism itself, seemingly a product of bloody culture, is a cultural
ersatz, and appropriation. It may be a ‘further step’ from today's
vegetarianism to veganism but on a lateral, cross-culture (cognitive)
route, not on a vertical, intra-culture (material) one. Not so much a
development or Ederian evolution as an abandonment of one culture for
another. 69 In a remarkable testimony proving that conscience is an
indispensable factor in the best scientific equation Watson and Cross,
like Gompertz and others, in much doubt due to orthodoxy's command
of nutritional knowledge, put bloodless culture in sharper perspective,
liberated from the eternalization of animal use, from the mythology of
the animal-product dietary and from the power-based ambivalence of
human/nonhuman relations, all of which are retained by vegetarianism.
And this has many implications, not least of which are for the
effectiveness of the movement's oppositional discourse and its
strategic/tactical dilemmas - which ends are dictating which means, or
vice versa, as the movement shifts, in part, from protest to public policy
activity 70 - and for normative perceptions and ideological
representations of animal liberation, many of which picture it as an
extreme of orthodoxy, eg an overidentification with animals, thus of
course validating the centre of animal-use, using the ALF as a political
synecdoche (strategy and representation having influenced the
philosophies in the first place). The equating of animal liberation with
vegetarianism affords the extreme label a certain legitimacy, for
vegetarianism seems to reside at bloody culture's refined periphery, at
its opposite pole to the raw bloody culture of, for example, hunting,
Roman and Renaissance periods. (Thus circumscribed it remains, albeit
idiosyncratically, within the realm of private lifestyle-menu options.
And this relates too to Tester's ability to entrap ‘animal rights’ within
the realm of bloody culture's anthropocentric ‘entrapment’ of animals).
But it would be illegitimate to view and represent veganism-animal
If there is a sense of development or evolution of bloodless culture it would be,
perhaps, to fruitarianism but how practicable that would be for whole societies has yet
to be shown, as have hitherto vague notions of non-exploitative symbiotic humannonhuman relations.
70 The outcome of an animal liberation which does not emulate and unequivocally
advocate non-use and uphold veganism as its base line is, ironically, illustrated in a
'state of the cause' comment by Singer himself: ‘What disturbs me is the fact that the
thrust for a really radical change in our attitude to animals - in other words, for equal
consideration of the interests of animals - keeps getting sidetracked into small
increments of progress in animal welfare’. Peter Singer, Interview in Outrage,
(June/July, 1993).
69
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liberation as an extreme rather than as, together, a genuine alternative
culture, civilization and civilizing process, one which is not defined and
shaped by invisible and ‘lesser’ slaveries. 71
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None of the foregoing has meant to suggest of course that veganism is itself a
strategy.
71
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A Wombat Wake: In Memoriam Birubi

Val Plumwood

M

y wombat Birubi died after a brief illness sometime around
Wednesday August 18th 1999. I miss Birubi greatly and
continue to catch his beloved form (or ‘ghost’) out of the
corner of my eye, a half-seen image flitting around the corner
of a cupboard or across the verandah. Long after his death, my eyes
continued to search out his shape on the moonlit grass. He was part of
my life for so long – over twelve years – that I found it hard to believe
he would no longer wait for me or greet me, that he was finally gone.
We had a wake for him a few days later. The idea of the wake was to
focus on his life rather than his death, to honor presence rather than
mourn absence, and to celebrate and express gratititude for Birubi’s life
and for wombat life more generally. We had a small ceremony for him,
and told many Birubi stories and wombat stories generally. Many of the
people who helped care for Birubi over the years when I was working
overseas or in distant parts of Australia were present with their own
experiences and thoughts to contribute. The wake was far from being a
dismal occasion. Birubi had a full and whole wombat life and died what
seemed to be a dignified and peaceful wombat death. He came to the
house for sanctuary in his final months and often rested or slept in front
of the fire, but returned to his burrow, snug pouch of mother earth, in
his last hours.
Birubi came to me from the wildlife rescue service as a malnourished
and very sick orphan. His mother had probably died of the mange, a
disease introduced by europeans with their dogs that brings so many
wombats to an early and tormented death. Since my own human son
had recently died, Birubi and I bonded strongly. Birubi (the name,
meaning I believe ‘the drum’, was given him by his first carers in the
rescue service) was about a year old, furred but still suckling, when he
21
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took up residence with me. He seemed to have suffered greatly from his
mother’s death and was desperate for care.
Birubi had received from his wombat mother a good quality wombat
education; she had taught him to defecate outside the burrow (or its
equivalent, my house), and the rudiments of survival in the bush.
Within a day of arriving he learnt to open the sliding glass doors of the
house and could go outside into the bush whenever he wished (which
was often). His ability to control the access between his world and mine
enabled him to be active in choosing and structuring the balance
between us, to enter my world while still fully retaining his
wombatness. He was generally wary of humans until he had clearly
established their identity, and would exit the house if it was too noisy or
unsettling.
Birubi grew to belong to both the world of the house and that of the
forest, supposedly exclusive and mutually oppositional. He needed a lot
of medical treatment and supplementary feeding for the first year, so he
became accustomed to the house and knew something of its comforts.
But from the beginning he was based primarily out of doors in various
holes he selected or renovated, and always preferred that world. Once
established in his own nearby burrows in the forest, he came to the
house on a visiting basis on the average for an hour or so most evenings
for personal, moral and material support. (At his behest I supplemented
his grazing with carrots and rolled oats, which corresponded to the
roots and seeds sections of the wombat diet). In the first year he would
spend part of the night out of doors, and part in my bed with me. He
initiated all these high contact arrangements, and would not easily be
turned aside from them, (although since wombats are nocturnal, they
often led to me getting inadequate sleep). Sometimes I had to exclude
him by locking the doors if he became too demanding of my time or
arrived at very unreasonable hours.
To sleep next to me was his ardent desire, but it presented some
difficulties. It was wise to get the leeches and ticks off him before letting
him into the bed if you wanted a comfortable rest. After I had got into
bed, he would come over and start biting its edge furiously until I gave
him a hand up. Once in bed, he would usually lie down next to me on
his side and drop off like a light. I can attest that during sleep he often
ground his teeth and also vocalised in ways that suggested the
imaginary encounters of dreaming. Usually he would wake up again
about two hours later and go outside to graze (and of course I was then
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obliged to get up to close the door he left open in case dangerous or
unsuitable animals entered.)
Since he was a skilful door and cupboard opener, Birubi had to be
locked out of the house when there was nobody else there. There are
many stories about what happened when Birubi got into the house
without supervision. He was very skilful with his mouth, which he used
for manipulation and encounter, and enjoyed opening and exploring
food packages and biting hard furniture and soft stuffed things. His
tastes are commemorated around my house on cushions, chairs, stools,
hassocks and cupboard doors.
Birubi was a vigorous player of various wombat chasing and hiding
games he began to teach me as soon as he recovered his strength. These
games seemed to me (there is of course much uncertainty here) to roll
together features of play, love and war. He played very rough by
human standards, but I do not think that he really intended to hurt - it’s
probably just that wombats are tougher, especially around the ankles,
his favourite nipping point when he caught you. He was a skilful game
player who expected to win, would sulk if he did not, and had learnt the
efficacy of feinting. When young, Birubi would have been happy I think
to play games all day, but fortunately this desire waned a bit as he grew
older. Even as an older wombat though he showed that he liked a game
and had a sense of humour.
I was aways conscious of a dimension of mystery in my knowledge of
Birubi’s mind. The sense of bridging a great gulf of difference was part
of the magic of the relationship. I think it was the centrality of the
mother-child relationship to both our species and what was shared in its
framework of ethics and expectations that made possible intimate
contact with a creature so very different. This kind of relationship is
necessarily cast in communicative terms that disrupt the severely
restricted vocabulary for describing animal behaviour and interaction
allowed by reductionist science and its objectivist ideals of nonrelationship or its near approximation, subject-object relationship.
Although you could entertain a large range of hypotheses about the
meaning, complexity and specificity of his responses, that relationship,
plus your knowledge of context and past interactions, usually suggested
some credible and reasonably lucid tale about the other’s mental
processes and attitudes that enabled you to continue relating as coactors in a partially shared narrative of the world. There were times,
especially when he was an adolescent testing out his power, when I felt
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my relationship with him was balanced on a knife edge, but as he
matured it took on a less precarious form.
Birubi, like other wombats and unlike dogs, was a resilient and
determined animal who could not be shaped to human will. He did not
recognise human superiority or pretensions to own the world and had a
strong sense of his own independent selfhood, his own equal interests
and entitlements. This stubbornness and sense of equality is the feature
that has brought the wombat so strongly into conflict with the farmer,
but to me it was wonderful. It meant that you were dealing with a real
other, that contact had to be on his terms and not just on yours.
Discipline, punishment and training to accept human will, of the sort we
apply to dogs, were out of the question; not only would they be totally
ineffective, but they would jeopardise the entire basis of relationship.
Once you had recognised that he would not give way to you, you were
motivated to find creative ways to work around conflict or to give way
yourself. A corollary of his independence was his anger when thwarted.
Birubi tended to get quite angry if shut out of the house or the vegie
patch, would snort in a loud disgusted tone and sometimes retaliate
destructively, for example by chewing the doormat or digging a big
hole in front of the garden gate. As primarily a grass eater, he rarely did
much harm in the vegie garden though (except for digging up the
carrots). He did not usually hold a grudge for long, although there were
a few occasions when he was still angry with me the next day for
something I had done the day before.
Wombats, being burrow dwellers, like a few home comforts. Birubi
liked to sit (and in his latter days especially sleep) right in front of the
wood stove in midwinter. He was fascinated by the fire and used to
poke his nose right up against the hot glass until it hurt (something he
never learnt not to do). He was very partial to a hot bum rub, and loved
to stand in front of the stove rubbing his rear end against the warm
corner. Birubi’s sexual expression began while he was still quite young
and only subsided in the last few years of his life. He was erotically
aroused by cushions, and would attempt to copulate with them after a
15 minute foreplay period of savage biting. He was often absent for
considerable periods, especially in the warmer months, and several
times I came across him miles away. I speculate that he may have been
away visiting wombat lovers. If so I hope he treated them better than he
did the cushions.
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Because wombats are solitary and do not form family groups, I know
little of Birubi’s relationships with other wombats, with the exception of
his male rival Clancy. Clancy lived about two kilometers away but
would often come over for a feed and a fight. He was openly envious of
Birubi’s privileges in relation to humans and wanted them for himself
(and himself alone). Birubi had to face up to Clancy’s aggression when
he was still a juvenile, and was valiant in the face of Clancy’s superior
age, size and fighting skills. Nevertheless when I heard the sounds of
warfare between Clancy and Birubi (a high pitched, harsh call), I would
run out and try to separate the combatants and bring peace and light,
but was sometimes unable to prevent the infliction of some nasty
wounds, mainly to Birubi.
The strife between Birubi and Clancy placed me in a painful conflict
between wombat ethical systems and human ones. Should I give my
favour to the stronger, as Clancy clearly hoped, or use my superior
strength to help and sustain the ‘wombat son’ I was so attached to ? I
found this a difficult moral dilemma, since Clancy was the indigenous
occupant, but in the end resolved it in the same way as most human
mothers, trying to honor commitment to protect the one near and dear
to me while avoiding injustice towards his enemy.
Birubi was wily, wary and tough, but the forest is a dangerous place.
Sometimes Birubi’s fear of what lay outside the door was palpable. I
could not protect him, and every time he left the house I knew that he
might be badly injured or that I might never see him again. So the
relationship was painful as well as joyful, just as it is for the many
human mothers who are powerless to prevent harm to the children they
love. Birubi was in great fear of dogs, the privileged gatekeeper animals
who are allowed and even encouraged to terrorise the others, and he
would often avoid my company, sometimes for a week or so, if I had
been to lunch at the house of someone who owned a dog. (I think if
people realised what terror and danger they cause to sensitive wild
animals like Birubi and those who care about them they would be much
more careful about owning and restraining dogs.) This is an example of
the great depth of temporal understanding available to those who
possess a well developed olfactory form of knowledge.
Birubi was an intelligent herbivore, a vegetarian, I believe, in the full
sense, both through his biological inheritance and through his
convictions. As a non meat-eater myself, I had a rare opportunity to
observe his opinions on meat eating when a friend came to stay
bringing with them a dog they fed normally on fresh mutton on the
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bone. I watched Birubi carefully inspecting and sniffing the site where
the dog ate its flesh meals and examining a partly consumed bone. He
gave every sign of horror, and came to the house only infrequently and
with the greatest reluctance while the dog and the meat smell remained
around. On another occasion, when I had fresh minced meat on my
hands from feeding an injured juvenile magpie, he backed away from
me with obvious revulsion and did not return until several days later
when the odour was gone.
Reduced sexual expression was one of a number of signs of aging in
Birubi’s last few years, which included the greying of his beautiful soft
coat and the general reduction in his energy and vigour as indicated by
his lessened interest in games and play. At age 13 he was one of the
oldest wombats the wildcare people had heard of. I put this down
mainly to my 5 kilometre distance from the nearest road, the automobile
being such a major cause of wombat carnage. Wombats have been
known to live to 25 years in captivity, and if Birubi aged prematurely in
these terms it could reflect an unknown disease process or the extreme
rigours of the early period of his life.
I feel it was an incredible privilege to be allowed to know a free, wary
and basically wild animal so intimately and richly. Our relationship cut
across the usual boundary between the wild and domestic, the forest
and the house, the nonhuman and the human, nature and culture. The
‘culture’ world is understood to be a humanised world in which
identities are assimilated to the human and conformed to human will,
interests and standards. In this world the ‘good dog’ is part of human
culture, trained to accept human dominance and human terms, (terms
made possible by the canine social system to be sure but still set by
humans), rather than to interact as an equal party bringing their own
independent terms. On the other side, the ‘nature’ world is one we in
the west tend now to see mainly through the instrumental and
reductionist framework of ‘detached’ science that tries to delegitimate
the rich personal knowledge of highly developed individual caring
relationships.
It is no coincidence that the more revolutionary forms of ethology
pioneered by women like Jane Goodall have given us new insights
precisely because they have broken these false choices down. Between
them, the ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ frameworks rule out the possibility of
deep personal contact with animals except on our terms. Birubi was a
‘wild familiar’ who established his own terms for contact and
friendship. It was an enormous thrill to explore forms of contact that
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transgressed the nature/culture boundary, so constitutive of our
civilisation. It was enchanting, the enchantment of childhood
imagination and story, to walk side by side with Birubi along a forest
track, to look up from my desk to find a forest-dwelling wombat sitting
in my armchair by the fire. You had the courage and freedom to cross
the boundary, Birubi. But do we ?
Ave atque vale, Birubi. We will remember you.
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Gender and Hybridity: the Significance
of Human/Animal Characters in Magic
Realist Fiction
Consuelo Rivera-Fuentes

Introduction

I

n the wake of genetic and tissue engineering, two concepts which
are deeply intertwined have acquired new connotations, not only in
the field of science but also in the thick fabric of cultural beliefs and
expectations which stem from the former and vice-versa; namely
hybridity and purification. Discourses around the purity of the human
species abound, and they help to maintain the separation between
humans and between humans and nonhuman animals. Birke and
Michael, 1 following Latour, 2 call this process of keeping separate the
human and nonhuman ‘purification’. This artificial separation
perpetuates discourses and practices of colonialism, racism and sexism,
which extend to nonhuman animals through the process I call
‘othering’, which is a desperate attempt at keeping the boundaries
between ‘the self‘ and ‘the other’, intact. However, this constant policing
of boundaries, which Latour sees as obsessive in modernity, covers up
increasing anxieties over hybridity -- because, as Birke and Michael
note: ‘[T]he notion of hybridity implies boundary -- crossing and mixing
-- if not literally, then certainly at a conceptual level’. 3 This would
confuse, they suggest, issues of humanity, animality and even of
individuality. We fear becoming part animal (a good example is fears
expressed in debates around xenotransplantation) which would make
us lose our ‘humanity’, our individuality, our sense of ‘self’.
Bio-medical narratives of human-nonhuman animal hybridisation have
played an important role in the raising of awareness about this
phenomenon. However, I want to highlight the importance of these
discourses in fictional narratives, such as fairy tales, fables and myths or
L. Birke and M. Michael, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Animal Bodies, Ethics, and Species
Boundaries’, Society and Animals, 6/3, (1998), p.255.
2 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hemstead,
1993).
3 L. Birke and M. Michael, ‘Hybrids, Rights, and Their Proliferation’, Animal Issues, 1/2,
(1997), p.13.
1
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legends. This is particularly true of those works of literature classified as
magic realism. Many cultures, such as the Greek, Roman and Latin
American ones have attempted to make sense of the making of the
world through historical accounts of their travels in which such
hybridisation is part and parcel of those narratives. 4
It is precisely those cultural fears or beliefs about human-animal
hybridity as expressed in the various genres of fiction I have mentioned
above, that I explore in this article. I examine some of these
representations from a feminist standpoint, particularly where they
meet in representations of reproduction, a topic central to gender
ideologies. Sarah Bakewell, in her analysis of images of bodily
transformation, notes that ‘[p]eople have always been fascinated by
stories of humans changing into animals, and animals behaving
anthropomorphically’. 5 She argues that these tales have to do with
issues of human identity and that they are often ‘adapted to elicit either
laughter or wide-eyed terror from the crowd around the campfire’. 6 I
could add to her argument that general public consumption of magic
realist and science fiction texts suggests that these genres appeal to
people precisely because the boundaries between fantasy and reality,
humans and animals, are fluid and interchangeable and therefore help
maintain cultural beliefs more or less intact. Moreover, I warn of the
dangers of ignoring the cultural powers of these representations.

Transgenic aliens, myths and ‘others’
Current public unease about cross species hybridity seems to invoke
fictional monsters ranging from the Frankenstein story 7 to bestial
beings, such as men with dogs’ heads 8 present in the collective memory
See, for example, P. Mason, Deconstructing America: Representations of the Other
(Routledge, London, 1990).
5 S. Bakewell, ‘Illustrations from the Wellcome Institute: Images of Bodily
Transformation’, Medical History, 42/4, (1998), p.503.
6 Ibid.
7 Jon Turney, Frankenstein’s Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (Yale
University Press, New Haven and London, 1998).
8 In her reference to Pliny the Elder’s descriptions of his encounters with people of
other races in his ‘armchair travels’ Sarah Bakewell comments that many of these
descriptions invoked a mixture of animal and human. She quotes Pliny’s assertion that
he encountered ‘men with dogs’ heads who are covered with wild beasts’ skin; they
bark instead of speaking’. Bakewell, ‘Illustrations from the Wellcome Institute’, p.504.
Bakewell presents us with a fascinating collection of images of hybridity reprinted with
4
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and imagination of folktales around the world. This fear is part of the
public response to recent experiments with transgenic organisms and
xenotransplantation, which reflect public fears of science combined with
ancient beliefs about the relationship between animals and humans -especially when boundaries are transgressed in the literal creation of
hybrids. If recipients of heart transplants believe that they might acquire
characteristics of the donor, 9 then what happens when the heart
received is that of a pig? 10 Does the recipient really believe that they will
act ‘piggily’, grunt or worse be ‘re-born’ with a pig’s tail? Implicit here is
the culturally-laden fear of becoming less human and more animal.
These anxieties, however, may rest on the separation of humans and
animals familiar to us in the modern world. But concomitantly, we seem
also to have lost our myths, and thus a tool by which we could explain
our role in the world around us, and which once helped us to
understand incompatibilities between culture and nature. Rather, in
Western culture, we have separated ourselves, created ourselves as
superior to any other kinds of living organisms. We have become ‘the
norm’ and anything else has become ‘the deviant’, ‘the monster’, ‘the
other’. As Birke and Michael note, ‘[s]eparation and autonomy are
defined against others - be they nonhuman animals, an ill-defined
“nature”, or particularly excluded groups of human others’. 11
‘Otherness’ extends also to other human beings: the history of colonial
conquest in Africa and the Americas relied on treating indigenous
peoples as animals, as less than humans. 12 Thus, ‘the savages’ often
featured in touring shows in Europe. Edwards illustrates this point with
some photographs and pamphlets from 1884 advertising a show of a
permission of The Wellcome Institute in London. For more on this see her, ‘Illustrations
from the Wellcome Institute’, pp.503-517.
9 See S.H. Basch, ‘The Intrapsychic Integration of a New Organ: A Clinical Study of
Kidney Transplantation’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 42, (1973), pp.364-84; R. Houser et al,
‘Transplantation: Implications of the Heart Transplantation Process for Rehabilitation
Counsellors’, Journal of Applied Rehabilitation Counselling, 23, (1992), pp.38-43. Also see
L. Birke, Feminism and the Biological Body (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,
1999).
10 See footnote 7 above.
11 Birke and Michael, ‘The Heart of the Matter’, p.3.
12 See Mason, Deconstructing America; E. Edwards (ed), Anthropology and Photography
1860-1920 (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992); and L. Schiebinger,
Nature’s Body: Sexual Politics and the Making of Modern Science (Pandora, London, 1993).
Parallel to this, there was the construction of dichotomies of human/animal,
rational/irrational which helped to create the narrative of inferior ‘others’ with respect
to women, in which women are the closest to nature, the irrational ones, and men are
the rational sentient superior beings. This, of course, allows violence and abuse against
women, since they are somehow ‘inferior’ and ‘the others’.
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group of Australian Aborigines who had been removed from
Queensland and toured for public exhibition. One of these pamphlets
has captions such as:
First introduction in England of the band of seven
Australian Boomerang Throwers consisting of male
and female Queensland Black Trackers and Ranting
Man Eaters! Veritable Blood-Thirsty Beasts, Lowest
Order of Man. 13
Note the familiar discourse of animality: Blood-Thirsty Beasts, and so on.
The photos feature a man and a woman, both naked from the waist up
bearing their cultural ornaments such as tattoos and jewellery, and
posing for the ‘white’ lens of R.A. Cunningham early in 1883. The
separation from the ‘civilised’, thinking, speaking human is emphasised
not only in the language used but also in the photographic
representation of ‘race’ and difference. I must emphasise here that
separation from animals is centrally part of Judeo-Christian heritage. 14
Modern Christianity demands individual moral responsibility, therefore
separation from the collective responsibility for nature. Yet, this is quite
recent in history; 15 Christianity in Medieval times up to the nineteenth
century held nonhuman animals morally responsible for ‘crimes’ such
as thefts, chattering in church and even murder! (cf. Evans’s ‘trials of
animals’).
By contrast, hybrid forms, whatever their origins, threaten and
unbalance that separation from ‘others’, hence the fears (ie we might
become ‘others’) present in popular representations such as folktales,
fables and myths. As I stated above, fear of hybrids is often expressed in
fiction but especially in the genres of science fiction and magical realism.
Before I launch into the hybrid characters present in fiction, I want to
distinguish human-animal hybrids from allegorical, symbolical
representations of human societal life through animals with human
characteristics. We are all familiar with jokes and advertisements
featuring animals dressed in human clothes and performing human
activities such as male beavers ‘busy’ reading the newspaper whilst
‘Mrs Beaver’ (a human female) speaks on the phone to some friend and

Edwards, Anthropology and Photography 1860-1920, p.53.
See N. Newman, ‘Carnal Boundaries: The Commingling of Flesh in Theory and
Practice’ in L. Birke and R. Hubbard (eds), Reinventing Biology: Respect for Life and the
Creation of Knowledge (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995), pp.191-227.
15 See J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Gerald Duckworth, London, 1974).
13
14
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says: ‘No, he’s not busy ... in fact, that whole thing is just a myth’. 16 The
popularity of Gary Larson’s Far Side cartoons illustrates this point.
‘[I]f we meet with imagery that seems to be calling us to look beyond
the immediate event and its emotional ramifications, we may suspect
we are dealing with symbol or allegory’, writes Alice Landy. 17 Allegory
usually carries moral teachings through animal characters with human
qualities. Some writers such as George Orwell have gone a step further
in their use of allegory in order to denounce how the politics of
language ‘may lose its humane meanings under the pressure of political
bestiality and falsehood’. 18 His Animal Farm is an example, in which pigs,
horses, donkeys and farm birds plot revolution against the cruelty of
human beings. Pigs in Orwell’s story use their ‘politics of language’ to
convince the other animals on the farm that, under their guidance, the
world (the farm) will change for the better and that they will all live in a
utopian society of equality and respect. But in doing so, they acquire
negative human passions, and so the circle starts again. The farm
animals attend meetings called by the pigs; these plot against each other
and even kill any of their fellow animals who might oppose them. Does
this sound disturbingly familiar?
Traditional fairy tales also use animal characters in this way; who can
forget the wicked wolf in Red Riding Hood, or the cunning cat in The Cat
in Boots, for example? Mainstream as well as feminist literary critics
have analysed allegories and symbols present in these stories in depth,
particularly when it comes to warning girls of the dangers of going out
alone in the woods or at dark, or of getting pregnant outside marriage. 19
However, they have paid less attention to hybrid characters and their
meaning in terms of the cultural fears about becoming less than
humans.
Human/animal hybrids in myths, also help justify human dominance
over anything that is not human. Ironically, though, some humans
create ‘powerful’, mythical hybrids to keep other humans in fear and,
G. Larson, The Far Side Gallery 3 (Universal Press Syndicates, New York, 1988), p.65.
A. Landy, The Heath Introduction to Literature (D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington,
MA, 1996), p.435.
18 George Steiner, ‘The Hollow Miracle’ in D. Walder (ed), Literature in the Modern
World: Critical Essays and Documents (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990), p.346.
(My emphasis).
19 See, for example, C. Pinkola Estes, Women Who Run with the Wolves: Contacting the
Power of the Wild Woman (Rider, London, 1992); J. Zipes, The Brothers Grimm
(Routledge, London, 1988) and R. Cosslett, ‘Fairytales: Revising the Tradition’ in T.
Cosslett et al (eds), Women, Power and Resistance: An Introduction to Women’s Studies
(Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1996), pp.81-90.
16
17
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consequently, under control. Take, for example, the familiar
mythological -- as well as a Christian character present in the Bible -hybrid known as Satan, named from an Arabic word meaning
adversary. Satan personifies evil. Originally an angel who rebels against
the creator, he is punished expelled from heaven, and given animal
parts. Satan is usually conceived of as red, the colour of fire and blood, a
man with horns, a pointed tail, and cloven hoofs for feet, but older
representations emphasise his bestial qualities - showing him as a goat,
for example, which is closely associated with lechery and sexual
appetite. This, in the folk concept of Satan, would explain his
supposedly raping of women and consequently, the reproduction of
monstrous beings. Since reproduction is heavily gendered, the fears and
the guilt about the reproduction of these ‘monsters’, falls almost always
on the shoulders of women. These fears, as well as ideas about
motherhood, fatherhood, religion, and the control of reproduction tend
to pop up, more often than not, in popular literature, such as magazines,
newspaper articles, fairytales, and novels particularly science fiction
stories.
By the same token, we can say that the future of reproduction is also
about the future of women and therefore of gender. My interest in this
topic, as a feminist writer and sociologist, stems from my perception of
people’s preoccupation with human-non human animal relationships
expressed through folktales and myths, 20 all of which are gendered.
These myths then influence not only literature but also science.
It is in the intersection between myth, literature and science, that science
fiction writers are able to explore themes of reproduction and hybridity.
An example of this is the film Alien Resurrection. Here, Ripley, the main
protagonist, is impregnated with the alien’s genes to become after
several failed attempts at cloning her, a hybrid, with all the monstrous
I consider ‘myth’ as a branch of the folktale. If we think that myths usually explore
the world as it was in some past age before the present conditions were established,
then we can say that they handle creation and origins. When myth deals with
adventures of the gods, we might say that they are almost identical with the fairy tale
in that human communications happen through women, who become the ‘others’ and
the ‘objects’ of economic and kinship exchange. Folktales have an oral tradition which
is generally reproduced by women in the bedside stories they tell their children
without realising that, in the process of retelling folktales, they are also reproducing
their own alterity. The Anthology of World Mythology comments that: ‘In the 20th
century, the symbolic interpretation of myths moved from the external environment to
the internal environment of the unconscious mind. Sigmund Freud and his followers
view myths as the expression of the individual’s unconscious wishes, fears and drives’.
D. Rosenberg, World Mythology: An Anthology of the Great Myths and Epics (Harrap,
London, 1986), p.xix.
20
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characteristics of her alien parent (corrosive acid instead of blood,
enormous strength and extreme insensitivity towards human suffering),
yet in the body of Ripley. In turn, she is ‘adopted’ by a mutant baby
alien which she later pushes through the suction duct, in a clever
allegory for abortion. As the mutant baby disintegrates, his/her terrified
face and eyes become almost human and the cries of agony resemble
that of a human baby. Ripley sacrificed her adoptive baby to save Earth
like the Virgin Mary allowing Christ, her ‘alien’ son - for being only
partly human - to die for the whole of humanity. Thus, the film plays
with ancient fears of hybridity through women’s reproduction.
Inbreeding as a source of hybrids is another culturally gendered belief
originating in creation stories and myths. Whoever the creators are in
different cultures, they are always warning humans of the terrible
consequences of having sexual intercourse with close relatives: we could
bear animals or a mixture of human/non-human animal. People have
taken this a step further and included the dangers of practising sexual
intercourse with non-human animals, as if animals wanted to engage in
such ‘practices’ with humans! 21 Nevertheless, many oral folktales have
featured women being ‘raped’ by all sort of animals including snakes
and then giving birth to hybrids. This is particularly true of Latin
American folktales. Not surprisingly, then, the topic of women’s fear of
giving birth to monsters who are neither human nor animals - yet are
both - is often explored in the literary genre of magic realism, to which I
now turn.

A Hundred years of Solitude and a Millennium of
Iguanas
Although magic realism, as a literary term, has been mainly used to
describe the works of many Latin American writers, it can also be said
that a number of European novelists 22 incorporate magic realism in their
works of fiction. These novels ‘explore the unexpected, supernatural
and fantastic within a realistic frame of reference’. 23 The genre ‘typically

This is also, of course, a violation of animal rights.
Among many others in this genre, I can mention: Angela Carter, Emma Tennant,
Salman Rushdie, John Fowles, Elsa Morante and Fabrizia Ramondino.
23 C. Buck (ed), Bloomsbury Guide to Women’s Literature (Bloomsbury, London, 1992),
p.771.
21
22
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incorporates elements of dream, fantasy, myth and fairytale within
ostensibly realist narratives’. 24
Magical realism as is also known, ‘has become an almost universal
description of the ‘Latin American style’ - exotic and tropical,
overblown and unrestrained, phantasmagorical and hallucinatory - it is
so ideologically dangerous that it should really be rejected’, asserts
Martin in his analysis of Latin American fiction. 25 This has helped it gain
world recognition through novelists such as Angela Carter in Europe,
Alejo Carpentier, Gabriel García Márquez and Isabel Allende, to
mention just a few in the Americas. But magic realist fiction has also
helped record cultural beliefs including many regarding scientific,
biomedical concepts. In Latin America these beliefs are refracted
through discourses of masculinity and femininity expressed as the
ideologies of machismo and marianismo. 26 The latter stems from a
fusion of the Spanish Catholic dogma of the Virgin Mary (a pure,
unblemished young woman) with the indigenous concept of
motherhood, which includes Pachamama, Mother Earth (more than a
human being, in fact a goddess) according to Aymara myths. 27 This
blending of religion and paganism in gendered discourses of
motherhood is in itself a hybrid, as is the mestizaje that came from the
mixing of Spanish and indigenous genes. In this context, Latin
American literature is fertile ground for hybrid forms of all sorts and
both writers and readers find this phenomenon of b(l)ending rules,
norms, cultures, myths and beliefs in general, very ‘natural’ indeed.
Gabriel García Márquez, if not the ‘creator’ of magical realism in Latin
America, has been the first Latin American 28 writer to give magical
realism world recognition with his novel One Hundred Years of Solitude. 29
Generally, readers like the novel ‘because it appears to conjure up a

Ibid.
G. Martin, Journeys Through the Labyrinth: Latin American Fiction in the Twentieth
Century (Verso, London, 1989), p.141.
26 See J. Fisher, Out of the Shadows: Women, Resistance and the Politics in South America
(Latin American Bureau, London, 1993) and also C. Rivera-Fuentes, ‘They do not
Dance Alone: Latin American Women’s Movements’ in Cosslett, Women, Power and
Resistance.
27 Aymaras are indigenous people who live on the borders of Chile, Peru and Bolivia,
therefore influencing all three countries with their culture.
28 Alejo Carpentier and Miguel Angel Asturias are, according to literary critics, the first
Latin American writers to explore magic realist fiction in their novels after returning
from Paris where they encountered surrealism (See, for example, Martin, Journeys
through the Labyrinth).
29 G. García Márques, One Hundred Years of Solitude (Picador, London, 1978).
24
25
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magical reality’. 30 There is in the novel a blending of reality and fantasy
which makes it difficult for the reader to say where one begins or ends.
Significantly, the boundaries between humans and animals are fluid and
interchangeable, and not always just allegorical.
Briefly, the novel is a synopsis of Latin American historical experience
as seen through the life and eyes of the Buendía family. José Arcadio
Buendía and some others set out to find an outlet to the sea. Eventually,
after 26 months they abandoned the expedition and founded Macondo.
I am struck by the parallel here with Columbus and his expedition to
the Indias which, took him instead to the coast of Latin America. 31
However, it is as the Buendías’ story unfolds that we encounter the first
mention of hybridity:
To the south lay the swamps, covered with an
eternal vegetable scum, and the whole vast universe
of the great swamp, which according to what the
gypsies said, had no limits. The great swamp in the
west mingled with a boundless extension of water
where there were soft-skinned cetaceans that had
the head and torso of a woman, causing the
ruination of sailors with the charm of their
extraordinary breasts. 32
Fantasy and reality fuse here such that the reader simply accepts the
fantastic narration as reality in the story, though the allusion to the
mythological siren (or mermaid) is clear. Within Greek mythology, this
sea nymph lured sailors on to rocks by her singing, resulting in cultural
beliefs, widespread from medieval times until the 18th century in
Europe. So the writer creates or invokes a mythical figure like the
mermaid to call our attention to the fact that Latin America is a place
where indigenous and occidental cultures mix sexually, indeed inbreed,
to produce mestizaje, hybridisation. In other words, the significance here
of a mythological character like the siren is that Márquez is playing with
the Western belief that mixing with ‘uncivilised’/indigenous women
would cause the ‘ruination’ of a ‘civilized’, superior group of people, in
this case the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores. What I find
fascinating is that Márquez seems to be conveying that it was the
colonisers who ‘ruined’ the original inhabitants of the Latin American
continent by mixing with them, usually through the methodic raping of
women albeit excusing themselves by saying that it was because of ‘the
Martin, Journeys through the Labyrinth, p.224.
Cf P. Mason, Deconstructing America
32 Márques, One Hundred Years of Solitude, p.16.
30
31
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charm of their breasts’. As I commented above, the figure of the siren is
not a modern creation. Anthropologist Peter Mason refers, for example,
to Columbus’ letters to Luis de Santangel in 1493 in which the explorer
reports that on the islands of the Caribs ‘he saw three sirens, although
they were not as beautiful as he had been led to believe’. 33
The fantastic being in the shape of a siren in A Hundred Years of Solitude,
comes as no surprise, then, since the foundation of Macondo, has clear
undertones with the colonisation and foundation of Hispanic towns in
America. In Márquez’s text, however, the mermaid’s singing is
substituted by her alluring breasts perhaps a less subtle sexual discourse
on fears of reproducing with the ‘wrong’ species.
Interestingly, Mason also mentions Columbus’ comments in his letters
that on this island of the Caribs ‘people with tails are born’. 34
Interesting, because this further example of hybridity also appears in
One Hundred Years. The original couple, José Arcadio Buendía and his
cousin Ursula Iguaran delay the consummation of their marriage
because of her fear of incest which could bring about the bearing of
iguanas instead of human children. Also, note the name Ursula Iguaran,
which can be said to be, again, one of Márquez’s subtle jokes: Could
Urs(ul)a, if deconstructed, mean a female bear and Igua(r)a(n), iguana?
Maybe my deconstruction is extreme and bears (excuse the pun) no
relation to the author’s intentions, yet as a writer myself I feel tempted
to see beyond the obvious; after all, other names in the story are laden
with meaning (cf for example, Buendía (Good day in Spanish). But
going back to incest and inbreeding, the story of Ursula and José
Arcadio Buendía is such that:
Although their marriage was predicted from the
time they had come into the world, when they
expressed their desire to be married their own
relatives tried to stop it. They were afraid that those
two healthy products of two races that had
interbred over the centuries would suffer the same
shame of breeding iguanas. 35
To make this fear more believable, Márquez introduces a further, more
‘real’ example:

Ibid., p.102.
Ibid.
35 Ibid., pp.23-4.
33
34
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There had already been a horrible precedent. An
aunt of Ursula’s, married to an uncle of José
Arcadio Buendía, had a son who went through life
wearing loose, baggy trousers and who bled to
death after having lived forty-two years in the
purest state of virginity, for he had been born and
grown up with a cartilaginous tail in the shape of a
corkscrew and with a small tuft of hair on the tip. A
pig’s tail that was never allowed to be seen by any
woman and that cost him his life when a butcher
friend did him the favour of chopping it off with his
cleaver. 36
It is up to Ursula to stop incest by wearing chastity pants for a year,
despite her cousin’s efforts to consummate the marriage. This symbolic
birth control reflects Latin American gender roles in which women are
to control reproduction at any cost whilst men are to prove their
manhood by sleeping around indiscriminately, the proof of which is
children. When this virility is put into doubt by other men, they blame
their women. In the novel, after winning a cockfight, José Arcadio is
ridiculed by the angry loser thus:
Congratulations!, he shouted, Maybe that rooster of
yours can do your wife a favour. 37
On hearing this, José Arcadio kills the other man with a spear in front of
the whole town, goes back to his house and orders Ursula to take the
chastity pants off whilst threatening her with the spear. Ursula
responds:
You’ll be responsible for what happens. 38
To which he retorts:
If you bear iguanas, we’ll raise iguanas. But there’ll
be no more killings in this town because of you. 39
He not only reproaches Ursula for his blemished macho image but also,
and more infuriatingly for me as a female reader, blames her for a
murder he himself committed and for the potentiality of hybrids
through her reproduction (which reminds me of the blaming of women
Could this be a symbolic penis?
Márques, One Hundred Years of Solitude, p.25.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
36
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for bearing daughters). This is the archetype of Latin American
machismo.
A further and last example of hybridity present in One Hundred Years,
which unlike the two previous ones, has no connections to fears of
reproduction and inbreeding is that of a snake-man being toured in a
cage by the gipsies in Macondo. The narrator recounts:
[T]he crowd ... was witnessing the sad spectacle of
the man who had been turned into a snake for
having disobeyed his parents. 40
The ‘spectacle’ is peculiarly similar to the aborigines on display
mentioned earlier. In that show, it was difference which had to be
exhibited, emphasised and played against the ideological constructs of
civilisation. In this show, the fears are to do with being ‘unnatural’.
Disobedience to one’s parents in Latin American culture goes against
the ‘natural’, ‘normal’ behaviour and rules dictated by religious
ideologies. Malformation of one’s spirit is punishable and ‘corrected’
through some divine intervention, which draws parallels to scientific
intervention to amend physical deformities, even when they present no
threat of death to the ‘abnormal’ person. 41
Modern genetic engineering now gives us the possibility of creating
further ‘unnatural’ forms of hybrids between humans and other animals
that were hitherto imaginable only in fiction. Feminist historian of
science, Donna Haraway, exploring the interweaving of science-fiction
and modern genetics, remarks that on learning about Christian
salvation stories she has been ‘a marked woman informed by those
literacies as well as those given to [her] by birth and education’. 42 She
also notes the potential scientific creation of fantastic and exotic hybrid
forms through genetic engineering which evoke precisely those cultural
themes. Writing about OncoMouseTM, the patented mouse bearing the
gene for (human) breast cancer, Haraway comments:

I can’t but help make connections to the Christian creation story of Adam, Eve and
the snake in the Garden of Eden.
41 For example, geneticists might attempt to intervene to improve the ‘normal’, to give
the human body qualities beyond those given by nature. However, they first
experiment with animals, since animals are constructed as dispensable and inferior to
humans.
42 D. Haraway, Modest_Witness@ Second_Millennium. FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouseTM:
Feminism and Technoscience (Routledge, New York, 1997), p.2.
40
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OncoMouseTM is my sibling, and more properly,
male or female, s/he is my sister. Her essence is to
be a mammal, a bearer by definition of mammary
glands, and a site for the operation of a
transplanted, human, tumour-producing gene - an
oncogene - that reliably produces breast cancer.
Although her promise is decidedly secular, s/he is
a figure in the sense developed within Christian
realism: S/he is our scapegoat; s/he bars our
suffering; s/he signifies and enacts our mortality in
a powerful, historically specific way that promises a
culturally privileged kind of salvation - a “cure for
cancer”. 43
The imagery interweaving the fantasies of science-fiction and scientific
fact is powerfully explored by Lynn Randolph in her painting of a
human-mouse hybrid, created in response to Haraway’s paper ‘Mice
into Wormholes’. 44 The painting features a being which has the body of
a female mouse (with human looking breasts, hands and feet). She is
sitting inside a box, like a cage, observed by seven pairs of human eyes
as she stares out at the viewer. Significantly, she is crowned with thorns,
like Jesus Christ, supposedly to save humanity from cancer. Haraway
also makes this point when she comments that:
[Randolph’s OncoMouse] is a [Christ] figure in the
sacred-secular dramas of technoscientific salvation
history, with all the disavowed links to Christian
narrative that pervade U.S. scientific discourse. 45
What I want to emphasise is the reproductive aspect, not only of
oncogenes, which gender this hybrid (by suggesting with a sole image
of a breasted human-mouse, that the hybrid is somehow female) created
by genetic engineering and which play into cultural fears of hybrids and
of women being the ones to reproduce them. Scientists (usually male)
play God to create a monster which can ‘save’ us. But to do that, they
must have their victim, their ‘scapegoat’ as Haraway puts it. They must
impregnate a female mouse, with the diseased gene of a human, the
‘superior’, the ‘creator’ in order to save the rest of humanity from the
awful disease called cancer. Even if we accept the argument that the
creation of OncoMouse is justified to save humanity, this glosses over
the creation of many other experimental hybrid forms (all of which will
Ibid., p.79.
Lynn Randolph’s painting is entitled ‘The Laboratory, or The Passion of
OncoMouse’.
45 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p.47.
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be murdered in the name of science). 46 Here, there is a clear hint of the
phantasmagorical, something between reality and surreality, between
life and death, which is extremely disturbing for some women, since the
cross, 47 the cruza continues to fall on our shoulders.
Thus, the fears/anxieties about hybridity, reproduction and gender so
eloquently expressed by writers such as García Márquez, Angela Carter,
and Carol Emshwiller are evoked again by the literal creation of hybrids
in science. Carter’s Nights at the Circus 48 follows a female hybrid (she is
the daughter of a male swan and a woman and is called Fevvers,
possibly because of her wings and also because of her working class
origin) on a circus tour from London to Siberia. This is certainly a novel
in which magical realism and gender intersect; as the Bloomsbury Guide
to Women’s Literature rightly asserts:
Gender identities are positioned within an
interrogation of cultural mythologies of gender, as
well as a question of the whole problem of
“authenticity”: Am I fact or fiction? asks Fevvers. 49
As for Emshwiller, her novel Carmen Dog 50 is one in which animals turn
into women, while women mutate into birds and other animals. At
some point in the process of mutating they are hybrids and we read
about women like giant sloths
upside down in the lower branches of a tree. Some
are, you know, on the way up, others the reverse.
As I said: woman to beast, beast to woman, and not
much point to it all seems to me. 51
I will not go into the symbolism of this science fiction novel but what is
clear from the beginning is that men find it difficult to understand
womens’ change and try, of course, to control the whole process in the
name of reason and attempt to lead a ‘normal’ life with their hybrid
wives and lovers.

This has clear resonance with the fate of the hybrids (including the cloned Ripley) in
the film Alien Resurrection.
47 I am playing here with the religious and scientific meaning of ‘cross’ which also
means ‘hybrid’ in Spanish (just as ‘cross-breeding’ is used in English).
48 A. Carter, Nights at the Circus (Vintage Classics, London, 1994).
49 Buck, Bloomsbury Guide to Women’s Literature, p.861.
50 C.Emshwiller, Carmen Dog (The Women’s Press, London, 1988).
51 Ibid., p.1.
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Whatever scientists believe transgenes can do, the fear of bodily forms
that transgress species boundaries (in Randolph’s picture, half woman,
half mouse) runs deep in our culture. That is why the picture disturbs. It
touches on possibilities which are more than just fictional. It evokes
fears that science can now create the very fantastical forms which were
hitherto the prerogative of the novelist or storyteller.
We ignore these fears at our peril.
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THE FACE IN THE TREE
Simone Poirier-Bures

It was an overcast, November day, cool and still. A good day for a walk
along the gravel roads in rural Virginia where I live. I had been
struggling with words all day, trying to find them, tame them, use them.
The act of walking calmed me; the cool air filling my lungs, refreshed.
As I rounded a bend in the road, I felt myself being watched. I looked
up and saw an odd-looking creature eyeing me from the crook of two
bare branches. I studied the long white oval face, the narrow slanted
eyes lined in black, the pink nose, the rounded black ears with pink
tops. It didn't look quite real, more like the face of a plush toy, or a
novelty balloon. For a moment I thought it might be a stuffed animal
that someone had put in the tree as a joke. But as I advanced it moved
the tiniest bit, keeping its beady eyes on me.
Except for that small flicker of movement, the possum was as still as the
tree itself, not even blinking. I met its gaze, keeping myself just as still. I
noted its leathery tail curled like a hook, like an upside down question
mark. I wondered if I had surprised it, this nocturnal animal, now
trapped in daylight, and whether it was terrified.
I could feel the possum studying me as well, though it remained as still
as stone. It was amazing, really, the two of us facing each other across
the huge divide of our separate species. “Hello”, I said in a low voice. “I
won’t hurt you”.
I sensed that it understood, though not from my words. Some other
language ran between us, a language of gesture and scent, perhaps. I
thought of how we must smell, we big galumphing humans with our
sweat and soaps and perfumes, as we thump and thrash our way
through their woods. Does danger have a particular scent, I wondered,
something other than normal human scent? I imagined hunters as
giving off a hot red peppery scent, the walker a more benign one, like
salt. Surely the possum could smell my good intentions, or at least, my
lack of bad ones.
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I realized, then, that the possum must have been aware of me long
before I had become aware of it. It had been unlucky enough to be
caught in the open, but why had it not run off? Why had it stayed there,
locking me in its gaze?
Native Americans believe that animals choose to show themselves to
humans, so that humans can learn from them. Perhaps the possum had
shown itself to me on purpose, wanting to teach me something. How
lacking and insignificant words seemed now!
All around me, I could hear the low twittering of birds, things rustling
off under the trees. They were tiny sounds, sounds I probably would not
have heard if I were not then as still as the possum. I wondered how
many other creatures were watching me, watching this little drama
unfold. I imagined them peering out from burrows, from rocks, from
behind and over tree trunks.
I felt acutely aware, then, of the whole teeming animal and bird and
insect world, that enormous parallel universe that goes on side by side
with the human one, though most of the time we are barely aware of it.
Here, I was the intruder, the outsider, “other”. I felt a sudden piercing
desire to know that world, to see it through those thousands of eyes
peering out from the trees and leaf mold, to know how it must be to
experience the world wordlessly, through eye, ear, and nose.
The possum continued to watch me, and I, it. I knew that it would stay
this way for as long as I met its gaze - for hours, if necessary. But my
fingers were frozen, my leg muscles stiffening; it was time to go home. I
bent down to fix my shoelace, and when I stood up the possum was
gone. I had heard nothing, not even the faintest rustle; it had slipped
away, as silently as an apparition.
All the way home I peered into the trees, looking for faces. I saw none.
But I knew they were there, watching. Another would eventually show
itself, some brave ambassador come to remind us that we are not alone
here, that the human world is not everything, that another, larger world
surrounds us, like a dim memory waiting to be recalled.
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ISAZ
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR ANTHROZOOLOGY
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human-animal relationships by encouraging and publishing
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and psychological aspects of human-animal interactions,
ethological and behavioural approaches to the study of
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aims of the Society.
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Review Essays

Peter Singer, Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights
Movement, 222pp., Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1999.

Henry’s work can teach us how to make our ethical views become more
than words – how to put them into action, so that they have an impact
on the world. It is hard to imagine anything more important than that.
(Peter Singer, from the Preface).

In many ways, Peter Singer’s recent foray into biography, Ethics Into
Action, can be read as a manual for those who were moved by Animal
Liberation and wanted to take some action to prevent the unnecessary
suffering of non-human animals. Singer’s approach is to illustrate how
abstract ethical ideas can be applied in the real world and effect change,
by way of example: his subject is the late animal rights activist, Henry
Spira.
Spira, born in 1927, emerged from a tumultuous and difficult childhood
to embark on a varied career as a merchant marine, a private in the
United States Army, a teacher at a poor New York City public school
and finally a full time activist. His early interests in activism and
involvement in various socialist organisations caught the attention of
the FBI, who for some time kept Spira under surveillance and
documented his movements.
Spira’s interest in animal issues really began when he read a review of
Singer’s Animal Liberation, and came to see defence of animal interests as
a logical extension of his interests in the rights and interests of human
beings. Once committed to the cause of action on behalf of his nonvocal, non-human counterparts, Spira, through strategic planning,
creativity and sheer relentlessness, achieved some astounding victories
over individuals and organisations involved in animal exploitation.
Given the widespread impact of behaviourism in science and the social
norms of the period (beginning in the early seventies, when the term
‘animal liberation’ was often interpreted as a parody of the women’s
liberation movement, for example), Spira faced formidable opposition.
Any reader interested in animal issues will be fascinated by Singer’s
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accounts of Spira’s successes, among them his contribution to
preventing the notorious Draize-test through careful negotiation with
major cosmetics companies (most notably, Revlon).
To those with an interest in the animal rights movement, Ethics Into
Action lends an important historical perspective, but some will be
disappointed that animal interests and suffering come across as means
to an end: a meaningful life for the human beings in question. In the
sense that Singer is presenting Spira’s life as a case in point, one has the
sense that Singer’s conception of a meaningful life is unfortunately
narrow, and this is the major weakness of the book.
Whilst Spira, who eventually devotes himself to the liberation of
animals on a full-time basis, is presented as leading a meaningful life
devoted to ethical concerns, Singer neglects to address alternative but
perhaps equally valid lives of other persons discussed within the book
in relation to ethics. Spira’s father, we are told, methodically committed
a covered-up suicide in order that his wife and daughters
(intermittantly institutionalised for depression) could survive on his life
insurance payments. ‘He literally gave up his life for my mother and
sister’, says Spira (p. 42). Like Spira, his father was trying to prevent the
suffering of those who could not protect or care for themselves, and yet
this morally and ethically significant act is treated by Singer as a mere
episode in Spira’s life.
Similarly, Spira’s life is presented by Singer as that of a model animal
liberationist. In contrast, other individuals or groups seen to clash with
Spira are presented as hindering the ‘good’ work he did. Though this
may be the case, Singer does not give the reader the opportunity to
judge for him or herself, and thus one has the distinct uneasy feeling
that the account is biased in Spira’s favour. One is also constantly
reminded of Singer’s own influence on Spira through Animal Liberation
(chapter four is entitled ‘Animal Liberation’ and opens with a quotation
from Singer’s book), yet the book is lacking a philosophical assessment
of the utilitarian approach shared by Spira and Singer. Perhaps it is
unrealistic to expect Singer to be critical of what is essentially his own
position, given that his ‘argument’ for it is presented in Animal
Liberation. Nonetheless, when it comes to the biography of Spira, Singer
must realise that these views are not uncontroversial. Ethics Into Action
simply suggests that these views work and that by adopting them and
devoting our time to reducing suffering, we automatically accrue vital
meaning in our lives.
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What is needed are argument and explanation, and more discussion
about what constitutes “meaning”. According to Singer, it appears to be
physical and mental health and happiness – again, this is
uncontroversial, and tends to beg the question.
Given that the text is presented as exploring ethical questions, it comes
as a surprise that Spira’s methods are not questioned. He displayed an
uncanny ability to negotiate with large corporations in order to effect
change, but a potential criticism of this approach is that Spira was
success-driven and not principle-driven. Thus he would attempt to
work in conjunction with those corporations he was accusing of animal
exploitation, in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome. The
approach has the merit of being realistic, but Singer does not adequately
weigh up its merits and defects, leaving it vulnerable to the criticism
that he potentially jeopardised the animal rights movement in its
embryonic stages by not taking a strong enough position. Singer could
have provided more philosophical discussion regarding this issue.
Instead, his ‘Advice to Activists’ is entirely derived from Spira’s
methodology, as if this is ethically unproblematic.
Singer struggles to straddle the twin genres of biography and
philosophy. Unfortunately I don’t think he is successful: as biography
the account of Spira is rather brief and selective, as well as being onesided. In some ways this may be a case of the author being too close to
give an objective and well-rounded account of the subject and his
concerns. As philosophy, too many assumptions are left unexplored,
unjustified or unacknowledged, and Singer tends to feed the reader his
own views without challenging them. Though the emphasis is on
“action”, the ethical component is disappointing in its lack of depth and
its one sidedness. The book could almost be renamed ‘Animal Liberation
into Action’.
To his merit, Singer has chosen a fascinating subject – Spira’s is a
forceful and colourful persona, and the politics behind the animal rights
movement provides high drama (conflict, corruption, misappropriation
of funds and even – though very much an aside – murder). Readers will
enjoy the complex ‘plot’ of this biography, and Spira does present an
inspiring example (though not necessarily a blueprint) for activists.
Nevertheless, one is left with the feeling that the book, from an ethical
perspective, could only have been enriched by the presence of some
critical discussion of Spira’s philosophy and life, insofar as this is an
example of an ethical existence.
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Anne Quain
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Randy Malamud, Reading Zoos: Representations of Animals and Captivity, xi
+ 377pp., New York University Press, Washington Square 1998.

Are zoos texts? Not precisely – and so Randy Malamud, an English
professor at Georgia State University (USA), purports to 'read' them
through their stories (ie fictional accounts that feature zoo scenes,
inhabitants, or visitors). Finding in this way little if any redeeming value
in the institution, and much that is objectionable, Malamud writes a
staunchly abolitionist denunciation; indeed, his work of literary/moral
criticism borders on the polemical. Caveat lector, in other words, for here
hermeneutics of suspicion drive the argument: ‘if we examine the
evidence and documents of our own culture, through our
representations of zoos, I believe that the inconsistencies, the
hypocrisies, the logical fallacies, and the rationalizations that have
undergirded the perpetuation of zoos will become readily apparent; the
system will deconstruct (p. 49).
Under Malamud’s critical lens, zoo stories manifest many defects of
their subject. As seen through scores of authors’ eyes, zoos originate in
imperialistic impulses (melding conquest and captivity, exhibition and
exploitation), establish a regime of cruelty that oppresses by depriving
wild animals of their freedom and by inflicting painful somatic stress,
and encourage practices of spectatorship that stultify visitors and rob
inter-species encounters of elemental reciprocity. Given this list of ills, it
should not be surprising that Malamud decries the urban weekend
ritual of taking kids to the zoo. There is nothing innocent or amusing
about such outings: ‘zoos prove well-suited as a vehicle for children’s
anxiety, fear, insecurity; zoos evoke these unsettling psychological
reactions more prominently than they inspire (as zoo proponents would
proclaim) fun, education, or imagination’ (p. 293).
Stark stuff, this. Some readers may not persevere through Malamud’s
long, dark discourse. But then the history and legacy of the zoo is itself
long and dark. So sour a view of the institution may be unexpected,
especially for those who have subscribed to the popular, received
metaphor of zoo-as-ark of conservation/education. On the other hand,
philosophers and cultural critics ought not be strangers to mismatches
of ideological rhetoric and phenomenological reality. And such is the
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pattern at the structural heart of the zoological park - the central
contradiction revealed by Malamud is that even whilst they proclaim to
save wild animals, zoos actually extinguish biotic wildness both by
dislocating their keep and by overexposing them. Unauthenticity of this
sort deserves a thoroughgoing treatment of skeptical analysis.
Reading Zoos delivers that and unfortunately more, as its skepsis spills
over into a cynicism that sometimes obscures. There is a tendency in this
book, for instance, toward diagnostic totalization–negative judgments
are issued with the aprioristic ring of cant: ‘inevitably, commercial
culture will overshadow nature, replicating the dominance of imperial
culture over the subaltern’ (p. 97, italics added); ‘the cage essentially and
wholly defines, subordinates, whatever is inside’ (p. 119, italics added).
Similarly, polarities of global reasoning arise when, as Malamud seeks
to distinguish ‘the authentically enlightening intellectual experience of
animals’ from the distress visited upon animals at zoos, he ends up
posing the empirical difference as a dichotomy of principles:
‘imagination indicates creation, and pain deconstructs creation’ (p. 181).
Is the imagination never delusory, one wonders, or pain ever
ennobling? Maybe not, but the author's declamatory tone bespeaks a
refusal to ponder the former's pitfalls or the latter's generative
possibilities. Lastly, cultural cynicism again overcomes Malamud as he
offers to explain the popularity of zoos by positing a social addiction,
and so we are told that families frequently find themselves at animal
exhibitions because ‘parents capitulate to some [monolithically evil]
socio-cultural force’ (p.269). A more plausible account might make
reference to the perversion of an innate disposition toward animal
affinity (ie the biophilia recently theorized by a broad range of
scientists). 1
When it comes to prescribing therapies for the dismal state of biotic
encounter in our current culture, Malamud is modest at first and
confesses ignorance of the right way to regard wild animals. Yet he does
think there should be better ways than zoological display, ways that
would be more genuine and holistic. His chief recommendation is that
we enhance what could be called our ‘biological imaginary’: because
‘proper interaction with animals necessitates not [always] knowing
exactly where they are’ (p. 177), it appears that ‘a better way to
appreciate the animals with which we share this planet depends upon
See E. Wilson, Biophilia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984); S. Kellert
& E. Wilson (eds), The Biophilia Hypothesis (Island Press, Washington, DC, 1993); S.
Kellert, Kinship to Mastery: Biophilia in Human Evolution and Development (Island Press,
Washington, DC, 1997).
1
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the invisible: upon our imagination of animals ... when they are not
immediately present’ (p. 185). Developing an enriched ‘mental bestiary’ is
preferable to keeping zoos, Malamud claims, in that it is less
constraining for actual animals and more stimulating for humans. What
would this look like concretely? Imaginative exemplars of authentic
animal artistry, for Malamud, are the poetry of Marianne Moore and the
prints of Albrecht Dürer. Where would we get the natural history
necessary to feed and discipline our own zoomorphic imaginings? Here
Malamud comes up a bit short in defending nature documentaries as
the lesser of evils (compared to either zoos or expanded ecotourism). 2
I'd suggest rather a renewed investment in local sanctuaries for the
rehabilitation of displaced wildlife (eg Belize's Tropical Education
Center) as well as greater attention to the prospects for visiting native
refuge areas (eg Australia's Penguin Parade). 3
Though I have taken issue with Malamud on several points, I find
myself in broad agreement with his book's overarching indictment of
zoos as unauthentic institutions of animal representation. Perhaps he
has over-stated his case, but then – given the abundance in zoo
commentary of evasive apologetics and superficial reformism - it is
refreshing to read a critique that pulls no punches. If not unique in aim, 4
Reading Zoos is distinctive in method and singular in depth (the wealth
of literary coverage and careful interpretation is impressive in itself and
fruitful for further study). Before reboarding the ark floated by today's
conservation establishment, peruse Malamud and you may want to
abandon ship.

Ralph Acampora

An odd defense of a unidirectional medium (film), particularly since he goes on to
reject the interactive imagery of computerized animals (CD-ROMs, WWW sites) as
‘glitzy pap’ (p.262). The advent on American cable of the channel Animal Planet - a
kind of MTV of nature shows - demonstrates how biovisual broadcasts can be infected
by the empty excesses of cyberculture.
3 Likewise, opportunities for cross-species cohabitation in cities should not be
underestimated. Cf. Jennifer Wolch's animal-friendly project of green urbanism in
‘Zoöpolis’, in Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel (eds), Animal Geographies: Place, Politics &
Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands, (Verso, New York, 1998).
4 See also my ‘Extinction by Exhibition’, Human Ecology Review, 5/1, (1998), pp.1-4, and
‘Zoöpticon’ in M. Carroll and E. Tafoya (eds), Phenomenological Approaches to Popular
Culture, (Popular Press, Bowling Green University, 2000). For a sophisticated attempt
at transformative commentary, cf. S.L. Montgomery's ‘The Zoo: Theatre of the
Animals’, Science as Culture, 21, (1995), pp.565-602.
2
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Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Brute Science: Dilemmas of animal
experimentation, 286 pp., Routledge, London and New York 1996.

Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks’s Brute Science: Dilemmas of animal
experimentation builds a sophisticated and extremely convincing case
against the use of animals in medical research. This is not to say that
LaFollette and Shanks categorically reject animal experimentation,
instead they call for more effective measures for evaluating the success
of animal experimentation and a halt to exaggeration about its benefits.
While this reviewer would have preferred that the book take a firmer
stance on the issue, not least because the evidence marshalled seems to
call for it, this is the only disappointment afforded by the work.
The book is carefully organised around a progression of arguments that
at first glance caused consternation due to the claim made early on that
‘[w]e must delve deeper to determine the scientific and methodological
merits of animal experimentation. Only after we have done so will we
be able to morally evaluate the practice’ (p. 18). The suggestion that
moral considerations about the treatment of animals rest upon potential
benefits to other species is a position I would hesitate to support.
However, setting this objection aside it is clear that the authors put their
proposition to excellent use, producing a case that exploits the
uncertainty of benefit in contrast to the considerable moral costs of
experimentation.
Brute Science begins with a succinct account of both sides of the
vivisection debate. A central thesis of the book is that the use of
examples in arguing for or against vivisection is an inadequate strategy
unless these examples are evaluated in the context of best current
biological theory, here, evolutionary theory. Thus examples of medical
successes and failures produced by vivisection mean nothing unless the
ways in which such successes or failures occurred can be explained
through theory. Given that often times this debate is indeed conducted
on the level of example exchange, this is an important insight, and one
which shapes the book profoundly.
Chapter three looks at the origins of the current biomedical model,
citing Claude Bernard as the father of modern biomedicine. LaFollette
and Shanks note that Bernard embraced animal experimentation for two
main reasons, firstly because he considered observation and clinical
research unscientific due to the difficulty of controlling variables
adequately, and secondly because he rejected evolutionary theory and
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any concommitant view of species as significantly different. As a result,
he believed that science was best served by experimentation on animals
where as many variables as possible could be controlled, in the context
of a view of species differences as no more than superficial.
Thus, the book demonstrates that present day experimentation is
founded upon the rejection of evolutionary theory, a state of affairs that
is somewhat problematic given that evolutionary theory is presently
well accepted. Chapter four details the current biomedical paradigm
and makes clear the ways in which Bernard’s views are still central.
Chapters five and six detail evolutionary theory, setting the stage for
later arguments by emphasising evolutionary theory’s recognition of
real species discontinuities and its commitment to the notion of
nonlinear dynamical biological systems, a commitment that suggests
that where particular species differences are apparent, these differences,
though seemingly irrelevant to the experiment in question, limit the
possibility of extrapolating research findings from animals to humans.
Here, difference is understood to be not limited to single structures or
functions in the body, but necessarily indicative of other variations.
In this discussion a significant theme of the book emerges; that of
difference. This theme recurs consistently in section two where animal
experimentation is evaluated in scientific terms. A central dilemma
based on difference is uncovered here, for while researchers wish to
argue that animals are similar enough to humans to yield meaningful
data about human diseases, responses to drugs and other matters, they
also assume that animals are different enough to warrant different
(inferior) moral consideration. Returning to evolutionary theory, the
authors are able to demonstrate that both perspectives cannot coexist.
Where higher cognitive states are absent in animals (an absence that
allows morally for their use in experimentation) evolutionary theory
tells us that other, physiological, differences must also exist. Thus, the
very grounds upon which animals are considered valid moral subjects
for experimentation are the same grounds for why they are unsuitable
scientific subjects for experimentation. This review cannot do justice to
the complexity of the arguments made in this section, but suffice to say
that chapters seven to twelve provide very strong arguments against the
scientific validity of vivisection. Worthy of note here is the observation
that the most common defences of experimentation fall into the ‘it just
works’ category, a defence necessitated by the existence of significant
theoretical obstacles (demonstrated here) to seeing vivisection as viable
and by the lack of a detailed and serious measurement of its successes,
failures and costs. Also important to note is the treatment of basic
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research in this section, a treatment that is by contrast scant,
inconclusive and relatively weakly argued given that it is
simultaneously treated as perhaps the only area in which animal
experimentation has some clear value. This scant treatment becomes
more telling later in the book.
Having established that from a scientific point of view, animal
experimentation occupies a very dubious location in relation to medical
achievement, the authors move on to a moral evaluation of vivisection.
Marshalling an impressive repertoire of philosophical arguments, the
authors build a convincing case that due to the very uncertain scientific
benefits of animal experimentation, moral justifications are difficult to
launch effectively. For example, by arguing that current moral
standards consider an evil perpetrated worse than an evil left
unprevented, the onus is placed on vivisection to show exceptional
benefits given that it is a widely recognised evil perpetrated in order to
prevent the evils of illness. Additionally, having argued strongly for the
vagueness and inconclusiveness around vivisection’s efficacy (as well as
around its costs in terms of numbers of animals used), the authors are
able to demonstrate that under these terms, the possible prevention of
evil must be offset against the certain perpetration of evil. This is an even
tougher moral and scientific ask, given the portrait of vivisection offered
above.
It is somewhat disappointing to this reviewer then (as I noted at the
outset) that Brute Science stops short of identifying itself as opposed to
animal experimentation. This may be a strategic move designed to hold
the attention of those firmly in favour and easily put off by apparently
partisan analyses, but nevertheless, it is a move not supported by its
own material. Admittedly, there are many who hesitate to step
decisively into the oppositional role in this debate, after all, even wellknown champion of animals Donna Haraway, in her influential
Modest_Witness@Second
Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse
states, ‘my own ambivalence on the subject is unresolved’. 1 However,
having offered statements such as the following: ‘[t]o the extent that
researchers cannot measure the benefits of a practice [vivisection], to
that extent at least, they should not claim to know that the practice is
beneficial’ (p. 173) and ‘[t]herefore, there are no compelling moral
arguments for biomedical experiments using animals’ (p. 248) one
would think that the authors’ conclusions would be stronger. Instead
Donna J. Haraway, Modest _Witness@Second Millennium.
FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse (Routledge, London and New York, 1997), p.290
(n54).
1
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(and not insignificantly), policy recommendations are made which
emphasise the need to learn more about animals used in research, the
need to thoroughly evaluate animal research scientifically and the
importance of stronger public health interventions to deal with chronic
and preventable illness.
In the process, however, the authors return to the uncertain benefits of
basic research to conclude that ‘[t]he evidence to hand suggests that
biomedical research using animals - especially basic biomedical animal
research - has benefited humans, albeit, indirectly, and might continue
to do so’ (p. 262). Whether or not vivisection has benefited humans,
Brute Science has singularly failed to support this statement. If such
evidence exists, it is poorly represented in the book. 2 As such, the claim
signals a retreat from stronger conclusions that would be wellsupported in the body of the work. This, however, is the only criticism I
would offer, given the stimulating and thoroughly argued material the
book provides, but in the context of this urgent debate, it is a significant
one.
Suzanne Fraser

Though admittedly this perception may partly be influenced by my own strong
objection to animal research.
2
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Jonica Newby, The Pact for Survival: Humans and their Animal Companions,
280pp., Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney 1997.
Written by an Australian author and drawing heavily on Australian
research and making points illustrated by regional examples, The Pact
for Survival must have strong appeal for the local readership. Jonica
Newby is an Australian veterinary scientist and science journalist, and
she acknowledges a particularly heavy debt to another Australian
veterinarian, David Paxton, drawing extensively on the ‘lateral
thinking’ manifested in his doctoral thesis for the Australian National
University. The book however is anything but parochial in the scope of
its ideas. Indeed the outstanding characteristic of Newby's style is her
ability to review and integrate a vast array of theories and data, from a
vast range of sources. She draws upon the work of archaeologists,
anthropologists, historians, geneticists, biologists, philosophers and
ethologists (I’ve probably missed out some), making it accessible and
useful to the general reader.
The Pact for Survival must also have a paramount appeal to owners and
lovers of domestic dogs and cats, investigating as it does the history,
nature and origins of the relationship, and speculating as to its future.
However, the questions raised about human evolution and society are
hard-headed and exciting, and warrant widespread attention. At the
outset Newby dismisses as counter-productive to serious scientific
investigation the notion that dogs were somehow a human creation, and
by the end she has certainly presented a challenging array of hypotheses
as to how the two species came together and influenced each others'
development.
Why, Newby asks, have so few species succumbed to becoming pets?
What was special about dogs and cats? When and how did the process
begin? Is it conceivable that biological and social interactions between
humans and their pets have resulted in actual evolutionary change in
the human as well as sub-human species? How have they influenced
our culture - and we theirs? In the latter part of the book a series of
contemporary issues are addressed - are pets good for health? are pets
bad for the environment? how do they fit into modern town-planning?
All is drawn together in the concluding chapter, ‘The Urban Sextipede’
(after Paxton), which is provocative, persuasive and fun.
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In broad overview, the story runs as follows. The available
archaeological record shows that dogs have been around us for at least
12,000 years. Conceivably, when DNA technology improves, there will
be a case for arguing that dogs existed as a separate species as long as
80,000 years ago, when humans were acquiring language. ‘First dog’
may have been a pet, a sewage system, a hearing aid, or, most probably
in Newby’s opinion, all of the above. A major theoretical step is taken at
the end of Chapter 1, with the contention that the mixed species
community of dog-human was the unit on which natural selection
operated.
The next two chapters discuss evolutionary changes in canine and
human species. For dogs, this has involved a reduction in brain size, a
dulling of the senses, and neotenisation (retention of juvenile
characteristics) - none of which Newby considers to be really bad, given
the compensatory advantages of association with humans. An account
of an amazing Russian experiment in fox farming supports the notion
that selection for friendliness may bring about many and rapid physical
changes. The Ancient Romans knew about selective dog breeding; the
latest leap in such came with the establishment of breed standards in the
late 19th century. The chapter on humans begins blandly enough,
discussing the impact of domestic animals in various aspects of our
culture - of dogs on hunting, cattle and cats on agriculture, horses on
transport and warfare. The real excitement comes with the examination
of Paxton’s thesis, that the ‘extension’ of the human brain brought about
by the domestication of canines to include the dog’s superior olfactory
capacities permitted the substitution of the apparatus of speech for the
organs of smell, within the limited space of our cranium.
Chapters 4 and 5 take up very broad issues relating to human-animal
cultural interactions. Chapter 4 examines the changing fortunes of cats
and dogs across human history and habitat - their casting as devil,
insensate object, pariah, dinner, and finally, pet. A pet is defined as ‘an
animal that is kept for no other purpose.’ The rise of pet-keeping in
Europe from the 18th century onwards is portrayed as involving a shift
from opportunism to empathy, and as at least partly resulting from
increasing urbanisation. Here is foreshadowed the theme on which the
second half of the book pivots. Before that happens though, Chapter 5
describes portrayals of animals in art, language and literature, moving
on to a mind-blowing discussion of ‘talking with the animals’. Another
large-scale ongoing study of canine behaviour is reported, this one from
the Anthrozoology Institute in Southhampton, England, addressing the
issue as to whether communication in modern dogs has significantly
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departed from that in wolves. Results show that it has; furthermore all
the new signals displayed are to do with ‘being friendly’ - to us. Do
dogs have a culture? Well, yes, but canine cultural transmission occurs
via the mediation of human language. It is we who pass down to the
next generation of ourselves what and how to teach our pets!
There follows a competent review of the literature (much of it carried
out in Australia in the ’nineties) on the healing properties of pets in
contemporary life. The positive evidence suggests to Newby that the
adaptive biological function of dogs and cats in human society
continues, only differently. They help us deal with the challenges of
urbanisation, most notably loneliness. The author then goes on to
counter the notion (particularly popular in Australia) that an urban
presence of animal companions has a downside insofar as it increases
pollution, a task she accomplishes with ease and some levity. For one
thing, keeping pets helps to satisfy our drive towards nurturing, thus
assisting with zero population growth. More positively, she expounds
the concept of ‘biophilia’ (after E.O. Wilson) - that we are genetically
programmed ‘to seek out natural settings and affiliate with animals and
plants’. Unfortunately, modern town planners have forgotten to
incorporate the means for pet-keeping into their designs. The interests
of the animals and their owners are either ignored or misconstrued, as
the very demographic trends which make animal companionship so
valuable at the same time militate against maintaining it. We need them
more, but can have them less. Of course, in Beijing there is a dog farm
for city-dwellers to visit, while in Tokyo canine walkees may be rented
by the hour!
David Paxton argues the need to examine community change in terms
of how it affects a single, indivisible unit, made up of one two-legged
and one four-legged partner - the Urban Sextipede. Newby’s final
chapter is one of advocacy, in which she instances ways and means of
dealing with this entity, at the official and self-help levels. She is
passionate, practical, but also pessimistic. Although humans may be able
to survive in environments hostile to our ancient genetic partners, do
we really want to live there?
There are now lots of books on dogs and cats. Beginning in the 19th
century with treatises on their care and breeding, in the 20th century we
have this tradition continued, supplemented by manuals of dog
training, anecdotes and biographies, histories and picture books. In the
second half of the century the field expanded to include psychological
and biological studies, beginning in 1954 with Konrad Lorenz’s Man
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Meets Dog. Recently philosophers and psychologists have taken up
issues relating to the presence or absence in these species of
consciousness and emotion. The present book touches on most but goes
way beyond any of these modes in its breadth of knowledge and ideas,
scope of enquiry, seriousness and wit.

Alison M. Turtle
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Book Reviews
Clinton R. Sanders, Understanding Dogs: Living and Working with Canine
Companions, xviii + 201pp, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1999.
There is some conflict between the title and the content of this book.
Understanding Dogs is more a sociological study of how people relate to
dogs than it is a study in how to understand dogs. Sanders uses
observations of his own dogs, puppy training classes and the running of
a major veterinary hospital, interviews with dog care-takers (which he
equates with pet-owners), veterinarians, guide dog trainers and guide
dog owners.
Sanders begins with comments on the ways pet ownership relates to self
esteem, status and human sociability. Next he relates the dog owners’
beliefs about the capacity of dogs for thoughtful behaviour. Commonly
the owners do think that their dogs exercise reason but usually as linked
to emotions such as anger. The brief account of deception in dogs is
fascinating. Dogs are often regarded by owners as persons. Further
discussion on this point would have been welcome in the light of its
importance in developing an ethics in relation to animals. (There is very
little directly on ethics in this book, though the author displays love and
respect for dogs.)
Chapter Three focuses on what it is like to become a guide dog owner
and these owners’ ideas about their dogs unique personalities, attitudes
and intelligence (including intelligent disobedience). Examples of
thoughtful decision-making by these dogs are presented. The dogs’
empathetic abilities are also stressed. Then the discussion mores onto
how the owners interact with other humans. Here the human-centred
approach of the book starts to take hold.
The next chapter on the veterinarian concentrates on the ways in which
animals might cause problems in a vet clinic, not why. This does not
deepen our understanding of dogs much beyond saying they experience
stress and fear. There is a quite lengthy discussion about vets’ dilemmas
over euthanasia, clarifying how vets need to distant themselves from the
owners’ suffering. Very little is made of the loss to the animal incurred
by death. There are some interesting points made about the
consequences of regarding companion animals as persons or not but
these are not taken very far.
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We move on then to guide dog trainers. In the training centre studied,
the trainers agreed that ‘“dog understanding” was the most essential
attribute of a successful guide dog trainer’, but this is thought not to
apply to other training schools. Again the emphasis is on the human:
trainers and the public, trainers and the blind. ‘Dog understanding’ is
made up of a knowledge of dog behaviour and canine ethology
combined with an ability to ‘read’ the dog, to understand how the dog
is experiencing the training sessions. A description of good guide dogs
is given: dogs with ‘some degree of basic intelligence combined with a
“willingness” to learn while putting aside his or her “natural” instincts’
(p. 99). Guide dogs are distinguished as hard or soft depending on the
trainer’s estimation of their sensitivity. Some views of trainers are given
on whether dogs have emotions or think. The strain in behaviourist
analyses is clearly revealed, yet behaviourism is central to the training
programmes.
The final chapter entitled ‘Animal abilities and human-animal
interaction’ promises to engage more directly with how to understand
animals. Surveying and dismissing the view of animals as things,
Sanders favours the idea of animals as actors. He argues that at least
some animals have identifiable emotional experiences. They construct
and use mental representations ‘in order to orient themselves to their
surrounding physical and social environment’ (p. 113). They
communicate these ‘thoughts’ to others. There is simply a difference in
degree with humans. These general points are supported by a summary
of the primate research. This is interesting but off the topic. There is an
attempt to generalise to dogs but the same studies cannot be used.
Anecdotes are presented (stories of specific dogs’ abilities) and some of
the insights of the previous chapters are drawn together. The final
section of human-animal interactions contains an intriguing discussion
of play involving dogs and humans and what that reveals.

Denise Russell
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Book Notes
Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue, Shanker, Stuart G. and Taylor, Talbot J.,
Apes, Language and the Human Mind, vii + 244pp., Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1998.
This book attempts to draw out the philosophical implications of the
Kanzi (and Panbanisha) research for theories of language acquisition
and mind. Kanzi is a bonobo (non-human ape) who works mainly with
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh acquiring considerable linguistic skills. The first
70 pages detail this research, which allows plenty of space to develop
the philosophical arguments. This is done well but it is such a fertile
ground, there is much more that could be said.
Dolins, Francine L ed., Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare, x +
262 pp., Cambridge University Press, Oxford, 1999.
The sub-title to this collection is misleading. It consists of 17 papers with
only 3 specifically on animal welfare. (One is by Mary Midgley.) The
others cover issues to do with animal subjectivity, eg happiness in
chimpanzees; attitudes to animals and the use of animals in research
and education. Two of the most interesting contributions deal with wild
animals and endangered animals.
Manguel, Alberto, ed., By the Light of the Glow-Worm Lamp: Three
Centuries of Reflections on Nature, ix + 373pp., Plenum Trade, New York,
1998.
Famous and not so famous authors are reprinted here reflecting on
nature. Charles Darwin, Thoreau, Mark Twain, Audubon, Gerald
Manley Hopkins, D.H. Lawrence and Nabokov are a few of the wellknown names. The essays or extracts are collected around four themes:
landscape; birds; beasts; insects and fish. The beast extracts focus on: the
cat, beaver, bonte-quagga, narwhal and monkey. This is an eclectic and
entertaining edition.
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Payne, Katy, Silent Thunder: The Hidden Voice of Elephants, 288pp.,
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998.
The result of 12 years studying elephants in Kenya, Namibia and
Zimbabwe, Silent Thunder explores the abilities of elephants to
communicate with each other, sometimes over long distances, using
infrasound - sound below the range of human hearing in
communication. Detailed observations of elephant behaviour,
beautifully written, are also presented. A timely book given the
resurgence of the ivory trade.
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